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1. Introduction 
The U.S. economy  has entered a period of moderated  volatility,  or quies- 
cence. The long expansion  of the 1990s, the mild 2001 recession,  and the 
current moderate  recovery  reflect a trend over the past two  decades  to- 
wards moderation of the business  cycle and, more generally, reduced vol- 
atility in the growth  rate of GDP. 
This reduction  in volatility  is  evident  in the plot  of  the  four-quarter 
growth rate of real GDP in Figure 1. As is summarized  in Table 1, during 
the 1960s the standard deviation  of GDP growth  was  approximately  2.0 
percentage  points.  It rose to 2.7 percentage  points  in the 1970s and was 
2.6 percentage  points  in  the  1980s. But during  the  1990s, the  standard 
deviation  of four-quarter GDP growth  was  only  1.5 percentage  points. 
This moderation in volatility was noticed early on by those whose  daily 
job it is to track the U.S. economy:  the earliest analysis  of this volatility 
reduction that we are aware of is an unpublished  internal memorandum 
at the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System written by two 
staff economists  (Gilchrist and Kashyap, 1990). The first published  articles 
to identify  this moderation  in volatility  were by Kim and Nelson  (1999) 
and McConnell  and Perez-Quiros  (2000), who  independently  concluded 
This research was  funded  in part by  NSF grant SBR-9730489. We thank Shaghil  Ahmed, 
Susanto Basu, Ben Beranke,  Jean Boivin, John Femald, Jordi Gali, Robert Hall, Robert Ho- 
drik, Robert King, Lou Maccini, Athanasios  Orphanides, Pierre Perron, Jeremy Piger, Glenn 
Rudebusch,  Beth Anne  Wilson,  and the editors  for helpful  discussions  and suggestions. 160 *  STOCK  & WATSON 
Figure  1 ANNUAL GROWTH  RATES  OF GDP 
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Table 1  SUMMARY  STATISTICS  FOR  FOUR-QUARTER 
GROWTH IN REAL GDP, 1960-2001 
Sample  period  Mean  (%)  Standard  deviation  (%) 
1960-2001  3.3  2.3 
1960-1969  4.3  2.0 
1970-1979  3.2  2.7 
1980-1989  2.9  2.6 
1990-2001  3.0  1.5 
Notes:  Summary  statistics  are shown for 100 x ln(GDP,/GDPt  4),  where GDP,  is the 
quarterly  value of real GDP. 
that there was  a sharp decline,  or break, in the  volatility  of U.S. GDP 
growth in the first quarter of 1984. The moderation was also documented 
by Simon (2000). These papers have stimulated a substantial recent litera- 
ture, much of it yet unpublished,  that characterizes this decline in volatil- 
ity and searches for its cause.1 
1. See Ahmed,  Levin, and Wilson  (2002), Basistha and Startz (2001), Blanchard and Simon 
(2001), Boivin and Giannoni (2002a, 2002b), Chauvet and Potter (2001), Feroli (2002), Go- 
I  I 
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This article has two objectives. The first is to provide  a comprehensive 
characterization of the decline  in volatility  using  a large number  of U.S. 
economic  time series and a variety of methods  designed  to describe time- 
varying time-series processes.  In so doing, we review the literature on the 
moderation and attempt to resolve some of its disagreements  and discrep- 
ancies.  This analysis  is presented  in Sections  2, 3, and 4. Our empirical 
analysis  and review  of the literature leads  us to five conclusions: 
1.  The decline in volatility has occurred broadly across the U.S. economy: 
since  the mid-1980s,  measures  of employment  growth,  consumption 
growth,  and  sectoral  output  typically  have  had  standard  deviations 
60% to 70% of their values  during the 1970s and early 1980s. Fluctua- 
tions in wage  and price inflation have  also moderated  considerably. 
2.  For variables  that  measure  real  economic  activity,  the  moderation 
generally  is associated  with  reductions  in the conditional  variance in 
time-series  models,  not with  changes  in the conditional  mean; in the 
language  of autoregressions,  the variance reduction is attributable to a 
smaller error variance, not to changes in the autoregressive  coefficients. 
This conclusion  is consistent  with  the findings  of Ahmed,  Levin, and 
Wilson  (2002), Blanchard and Simon (2001), Pagan (2000), and Sensier 
and van Dijk (2001). 
3.  An important unresolved  question in the literature is whether the mod- 
eration was  a sharp break in the mid-1980s,  as initially  suggested  by 
Kim and  Nelson  (1999) and  McConnell  and  Perez-Quiros  (2000), or 
part of an ongoing  trend, as suggested  by Blanchard and Simon (2001). 
In our view  the evidence  better supports the break than the trend char- 
acterization; this is particularly true for interest-sensitive  sectors of the 
economy  such as consumer  durables and residential  investment. 
4.  Both univariate and multivariate estimates  of the break date center on 
1984. When we  analyze  168 series for breaks in their conditional  vari- 
ance, approximately  40% have  significant  breaks in their conditional 
variance in 1983-1985.  Our 67% confidence  interval for the break date 
in  the conditional  variance  of  four-quarter GDP growth  (given  past 
values  of GDP growth)  is  1982:4 to  1985:3, consistent  with  Kim and 
Nelson's  (1999) and McConnell and Perez-Quiros's  (2000) estimate  of 
1984:1. 
5.  This moderation  could  come  from two  nonexclusive  sources: smaller 
unforecastable disturbances  (impulses) or changes in how  those distur- 
lub (2000), Herrera and Pesavento (2002), Kahn, McConnel, and Perez-Quiros (2001), Kim, 
Nelson,  and Piger (2001), Pagan (2000), Primiceri (2002), Ramey and Vine (2001), Sensier 
and  van  Dijk (2001), Simon  (2001), Sims  and  Zha  (2002), and  Wamock  and  Warnock 
(2001). These papers  are discussed  below  in the context of their particular contribution. 162 *  STOCK  & WATSON 
bances  propagate  through  the  economy  (propagation).  Although  the 
propagation  mechanism  (as  captured  by  VAR  lag  coefficients)  ap- 
pears  to  have  changed  over  the  past  four  decades,  these  changes 
do not account for the magnitude  of the observed  reduction  in vola- 
tility.  Rather, the  observed  reduction  is  associated  with  a reduction 
in  the  magnitude  of  VAR forecast  errors, a finding  consistent  with 
the multivariate analyses  of Ahmed,  Levin, and Wilson (2002), Boivin 
and Giannoni (2002a, 2002b), Primiceri (2002), Simon (2001), and Sims 
and Zha (2002), although  partially at odds  with  Cogley  and Sargent 
(2002). 
The second  objective of this article is to provide  new  evidence  on the 
quantitative  importance  of various  explanations  for this "great modera- 
tion." These explanations  fall into three categories.  The first category  is 
changes  in the structure of the economy.  Candidate  structural changes 
include the shift in output from goods to services (Burns, 1960; Moore and 
Zarnowitz  1986), information-technology-led  improvements  in inventory 
management  (McConnell and Perez-Quiros, 2000; Kahn, McConnel, and 
Perez-Quiros, 2001, 2002), and innovations  in financial markets that facili- 
tate intertemporal smoothing  of consumption  and investment  (Blanchard 
and Simon, 2001). The second  category is improved  policy,  in particular 
improved monetary policy (e.g., Taylor, 1999b; Cogley and Sargent, 2001), 
and the third category is good  luck, that is, reductions  in the variance of 
exogenous  structural shocks. 
We address these explanations  in Section 5. In brief, we  conclude  that 
structural shifts, such as changes in inventory management  and financial 
markets, fail to explain the timing and magnitude  of the moderation docu- 
mented in Sections 2-4.  Changes in U.S. monetary policy seem to account 
for some of the moderation, but most of the moderation seems to be attrib- 
utable to reductions  in the volatility  of structural shocks. Altogether,  we 
estimate that the moderation  in volatility  is attributable to a combination 
of improved  policy  (10-25%), identifiable  good  luck in the form of pro- 
ductivity  and  commodity  price  shocks  (20-30%),  and  other,  unknown 
forms  of  good  luck  that manifest  themselves  as  smaller  reduced-form 
forecast errors (40-60%); as discussed  in Section 5, these percentages have 
many  caveats. 
2.  Reductions in Volatility throughout  the Economy 
This section documents  the widespread  reduction in volatility in the 1990s 
and provides some nonparametric estimates of this reduction for 22 major 
economic  time series. We begin  with  a brief discussion  of the data. Has the  Business  Cycle  Changed  and Why?  * 163 
2.1  DATA AND  TRANSFORMATIONS 
In all, we consider data on 168 quarterly macroeconomic  time series from 
1959:1 to  2001:3. The  U.S.  data  represent  a  wide  range  of  macroeco- 
nomic activity and are usefully  grouped  into six categories: (1) NIPA de- 
compositions  of  real GDP,  (2) money,  credit,  interest  rates,  and  stock 
prices, (3) housing,  (4) industrial production,  (5) inventories,  orders, and 
sales, (6) employment.  In addition, we consider industrial production  for 
five  other OECD countries.  Seasonally  adjusted  series were  used  when 
available. 
Most of our analysis uses these quarterly data, transformed to eliminate 
trends and obvious  nonstationarity.  Specifically, most real variables were 
transformed  to growth  rates (at an annual rate), prices and wages  were 
transformed to changes in inflation rates (at an annual rate), and interest 
rates were transformed to first differences. For some applications (such as 
the data description  in Section 2.2) we use annual growth rates or annual 
differences  of  the  quarterly  data.  For variable  transformed  to  growth 
rates, say Xt, this means  that the summary  statistics are reported for the 
series 100 x ln(Xt/X  -4). For prices and wages, the corresponding transfor- 
mation  is  100  X  [ln(Xt/Xt-l)  -  ln(Xt-4/Xt-5)],  and  for  interest  rates  the 
transformation  is Xt -  Xt-4. Definitions  and  specific  transformations  used 
for each series are listed  in Appendix  B. 
2.2 HISTORICAL  VOLATILITY  OF MAJOR  ECONOMIC 
TIME  SERIES 
2.2.1 Volatility by Decade  Table 2 reports the sample  standard deviation 
of 22 leading  macroeconomic  time  series by  decade  (2000 and 2001 are 
included in the 1990s). Each decade's standard deviation is presented rela- 
tive to the full-sample  standard deviation,  so a value  less than one indi- 
cates a period  of relatively  low  volatility.  All series were  less volatile  in 
the 1990s than over the full sample,  and all but one series (consumption 
of nondurables)  were  less volatile  in the 1990s than in the 1980s. On the 
demand side, the 1990 relative standard deviations ranged from 0.65 (gov- 
ernment spending  and residential investment)  to 0.89 (nonresidential  in- 
vestment).  On the production  side,  the  standard  deviations  during  the 
1990s, relative to the full sample, range from 0.65 (durable goods produc- 
tion) to 0.87 (services). Comparable volatility  reductions  are found when 
standard deviations  are compared before and after the 1984:I  break date of 
Kim and Nelson  (1999) and McConnell and Perez-Quiros  (2000) (Table 2, 
final column). 
This decline in volatility is reflected in other series as well. For example, 
the relative standard deviation  of annual growth  of nonagricultural  em- Table 2  STANDARD  DEVIATIONS, BY DECADE, OF ANNUAL  GROWTH RATES OR CHANGES 
OF 22 MACROECONOMIC TIME SERIES 
Standard deviation, relative to 
1960-2001 
Standard deviation 
Standard deviation  1960-  1970-  1980-  1990-  1984-2001, 
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0.98  1.18 
0.97  1.17 
0.87  1.18 
1.06  1.22 
1.07  0.84 
0.82  1.15 
0.77  1.29 
0.87  1.17 
0.78  1.25 
1.12  0.92 
1.07  1.13 
0.87  1.24 
1.40  1.00 
0.97  1.13 
1.00  1.14 
0.92  1.16 
1.41  0.52 
0.73  1.33 
0.94  1.21 
0.69  1.51 
0.51  1.10 
0.43  0.65 
1.14  0.67 
1.07  0.78 
1.13  0.79 
0.81  0.87 
1.20  0.88 
1.22  0.77 
1.04  0.84 
1.06  0.89 
1.23  0.65 
1.22  0.71 
1.12  0.66 
1.14  0.70 
0.85  0.65 
1.13  0.76 
1.16  0.68 
1.22  0.65 
1.01  0.87 
1.11  0.73 
1.09  0.73 
1.06  0.50 
1.43  0.75 
1.67  0.82 
Notes: NIPA series are annual growth  rates, except  for the change  in inventory  investment,  which  is the annual difference  of the quarterly  change  in inventories 
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ployment  in the 1990s was  0.73. The 1990s were  also a period  of quies- 
cence  for inflation: changes  in  annual  price  inflation,  measured  by  the 
GDP deflator, has a relative standard deviation  of 0.50. As noted by Kim, 
Nelson,  and Piger (2001), Watson (1999), and Basistha and Startz (2001), 
the situation  for interest rates is somewhat  more complex.  Although  the 
variance of interest rates decreased across the term structure, the decrease 
was  more marked at the short than at the long  end, that is, the relative 
volatility  of long  rates increased. 
2.2.2  Estimates of Time-Varying Standard Deviations  Figure  2  provides 
graphical  evidence  on  the decline  in volatility  for the 22 time  series  in 
Table 2. The light line in Figure 2 is a "raw" estimate  of the volatility  of 
the series, the absolute value  of the deviation  of each series (transformed 
as in Table 2) from its mean. To provide  a guide  to the numerical impor- 
tance  of  the  change  in  the  standard  deviation,  the  NIPA  series  are 
weighted  by their average nominal  share in GDP from 1960 to 2001 (the 
weights  are indicated in the figure labels).2 For example, for consumption, 
the light line is the absolute value  of the demeaned  four-quarter growth 
in consumption,  weighted  by the average share of consumption,  0.64. The 
solid,  smoother  line  is a two-sided  estimate  of the instantaneous  time- 
varying  standard  deviation  of the series, based  on a fourth-order auto- 
regression [AR(4)] with time-varying parameters and stochastic volatility. 
This model and associated non-Gaussian  smoother are conceptually  simi- 
lar (but different in details)  to the multivariate  approach in Cogley  and 
Sargent (2002) and are discussed  further in Appendix  A. 
The results in Figure 2 present a varied picture of the decline  in vola- 
tility.  For  some  series-GDP,  total  goods  production,  durable-goods 
consumption  and  production,  total  investment,  residential  investment, 
construction output, and imports-volatility  declines sharply in the mid- 
1980s. A closer look at the components  of investment  shows  that the over- 
all decline in its volatility  is associated with a sharp decline in residential 
investment  in  the mid-1980s.  For some  series,  such  as consumption  of 
nondurables  and  government  consumption,  volatility  is essentially  un- 
changed  over the sample. The volatility  of employment  growth  seems  to 
2. Specifically, let A4  In GDPt =  ln(GDP,/GDPt-4)  be the four-quarter growth  rate of GDP, 
and let Xjt denote  the level  of the jth  of n components  of GDP, where  imports  have  a 
negative  sign and where  X,, is the quarterly change in inventory  investment.  Then A4  In 
GDPt  I  Sl  A4  In X1t +  * *  +  Sn,-,t  A4 In Xn  -,  +  (A4Xnt)/GDPt,  where  Sj,  is the GDP share 
of the jth  component  at date t. The first n -  1 terms are the share-weighted  growth rates 
of the components,  other than inventories, and the final term is the four-quarter difference 
of the quarterly change in inventories,  relative to GDP. If the terms in the expression  for 
A4  In GDPt were uncorrelated (they are not), then the sum of their variances would  equal 
the variance of A4 In GDP,. 166 * STOCK & WATSON 
Figure 2 TIME-VARYING STANDARD  DEVIATIONS 
A.  GOP 
v 
0 
0  c 
o) 




0  (/ 
Year 
C.  Consumption  -  Durobles 
(Weight  = 0.08) 
? 
. 
,,  I 
.  . 
a>1 
o 





1955  1960  1965  1970  1975  1980  1985  1990  1995  2000  2 
Yeor 
E.  Consumption  -  Services 
(Weight  = 0.32) 
B. Consumption 
(Weight 0.64) 
1955  1960  1965  1970  1975  1980  1985  1990  1995  2000  20( 
Year 
. Consumption  -  Nonduroble 
(Weight  = 0.24) 






1955  1960  1965  1970  1975  1980  1985  1990  1995  2000  2005 
Year 
F. Investment 




a-  1L 
1955  1960  1965  1970  1975  1980  1985  1990  1995  2000 
Yeor 
2005 
G.  Fixed  Investment  -  Totol 
(Weight  =0.16) 
.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 
1960  1965  1970  1975  1980  1985  1990  1995  2000 
Yeor 
H.  Fixed  Investment  -  Nonresidentiol 
(Weight  =0.11) 
o 
a 
N)  (  t~ 
1955  1960  1965  1970  1975  1980  1985  1990  1995  2000 
Year 






fC.  a- 
Dn 
0 
N  .  .  .  ....  . .-..  ..  . .....  O  I  '..  1  ....-..  IV  .  ,  - 
UJ  .  ,,I. 
V  .  .  .  .  .  ...  ..  .  .  .  .  . .. 
w  ,  .  1  . 
u  ..  .  .  .  .  O  .*  -.  .  .  .  .  .  ...  . 
. 
vi  AMA'1iAL\,AP Has the Business  Cycle  Changed  and Why?  ? 167 
Figure  2 CONTINUED 
I. Fixed  Investment  -  Residential 
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Figure  2 CONTINUED 
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have declined in steps, first falling from the 1950s to the 1960s, then falling 
again in the early 1980s and the early 1990s. The volatility  of changes  in 
short-term interest rates fell sharply in the mid-1980s, then continued  to 
fall, whereas long-term rates remain as volatile as they were in the 1970s. 
2.2.3 Resultsfor Other  Series  The decline in volatility seen for the 22 series 
in Table 2 is typical of other macroeconomic  time series. Across  the 168 
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tive standard deviation  in the 1990s is 0.73, and 78% of the series had a 
relative standard deviation  less  than 0.85 in the 1990s. For example,  the 
relative standard deviation  of the overall index  of industrial production 
in the 1990s was 0.63; this reduction is also found in the various industrial 
production  sectors,  with  sectoral  relative  standard  deviations  ranging 
from  0.59  (consumer  goods)  to  0.77  (utilities).  Orders  and  inventories 
showed  a similar decline in volatility; the average relative standard devia- 
tion was 0.68 for these series in the 1990s. As discussed  in more detail by 
Wamock and Wamock (2001), the standard deviation of employment  also 
fell  in  most  sectors  (the  exceptions  being  contract  construction,  FIRE, 
services,  and wholesale  and retail trade, where  the relative standard de- 
viations  are close  to  one).  Although  broad  measures  of  inflation  show 
marked declines in volatility, some producer prices showed  little decrease 
or an increase in volatility,  and the overall index  of producer prices has 
a relative standard deviation  close to one. 
Finally, as discussed  in Blanchard and Simon (2001) and Simon (2001), 
the decrease  in volatility  is not unique  to the United  States. The relative 
standard deviation  of industrial production  indexes  for several other de- 
veloped  countries  were  low  in  the  1990s.  However,  some  countries 
(France, Japan, and  Germany)  also  experienced  low  variability  in  the 
1980s and experienced  somewhat  more variability in the 1990s. 
2.2.4 Implicationsfor  Recessions  and Expansions  Because recessions are de- 
fined as periods  of absolute decline in economic  activity, reduced volatil- 
ity with the same mean growth rate implies fewer and shorter recessions. 
As  discussed  further by  Kim and  Nelson  (1999), Blanchard and  Simon 
(2001), Chauvet  and  Potter (2001), and  Pagan  (2000), this suggests  that 
the decrease  in the variance  of GDP has played  a major role in the in- 
creased length  of business-cycle  expansions  over the past two  decades. 
2.3 SUMMARY 
The moderation in volatility in the 1990s is widespread  (but not universal) 
and appears in both nominal  and real series. When the NIPA series are 
weighted  by  their shares  in GDP, the decline  in volatility  is most  pro- 
nounced  for residential investment,  output of durable goods,  and output 
of structures. The decline  in volatility  appears both in measures  of real 
economic  activity and in broad measures of wage  and price inflation. For 
the series with  the largest declines  in volatility,  volatility  seems  to have 
fallen sharply  in the mid-1980s,  but to draw this conclusion  with  confi- 
dence we need to apply some statistical tests to distinguish  distinct breaks 
from steady trend declines in volatility, a task taken up in the next section. 170 * STOCK & WATSON 
3. Dating the Great  Moderation 
The evidence  in Section 2 points toward a widespread  decline  in volatil- 
ity  throughout  the  economy.  In this  section,  we  consider  whether  this 
decline is associated with  a single distinct break in the volatility  of these 
series and, if so, when  the break occurred. We study the issue  of a break 
in the variance, first using univariate methods,  and then using multivari- 
ate methods.  We  begin  by  examining  univariate  evidence  on  whether 
the change  in the variance is associated  with  changes  in the conditional 
mean of the univariate time-series  process  or changes  in the conditional 
variance. 
3.1 CHANGES  IN MEAN VS. CHANGES  IN VARIANCE: 
UNIVARIATE  EVIDENCE 
The changes in the variance evident  in Figure 2 could arise from changes 
in the autoregressive  coefficients (that is, changes in the conditional mean 
of the process, given  its past values),  changes  in the innovation  variance 
(that is, changes in the conditional variance), or both. Said differently, the 
change  in the variance of a series can be associated  with  changes  in its 
spectral  shape,  changes  in the  level  of  its  spectrum,  or both.  Research 
on  this  issue  has  generally  concluded  that the  changes  in variance  are 
associated  with  changes  in  conditional  variances.  This conclusion  was 
reached by Blanchard and Simon (2001) for GDP and by Sensier and van 
Dijk (2001) using  autoregressive  models,  and by Ahmed,  Levin, and Wil- 
son  (2002) using  spectral methods.  Kim and Nelson  (1999) suggest  that 
both the conditional  mean and conditional  variance of GDP changed,  al- 
though  Pagan  (2000) argues  that the  changes  in  the  conditional  mean 
function  are quantitatively  minor.  Cogley  and  Sargent  (2002) focus  on 
the inflation process and conclude  that although most of the reduction in 
volatility  is associated  with  reductions  in the innovation  variance, some 
seems  to be associated  with  changes  in the conditional  mean.3 
3.1.1 Testsfor Time-Varying  Means and Variances  We take a closer look at 
the issue  of conditional  means  vs.  conditional  variances using  a battery 
of break tests, applied  to time-varying  autoregressive  models  of the 168 
series listed in Appendix  B. The tests look for changes in the coefficients 
in the AR model 
3. Cogley  and Sargent (2001, 2002) are especially  interested  in whether  there has been  a 
change in the persistence  of inflation. The evidence  on this issue  seems,  however,  to be 
sensitive  to the statistical method  used: Pivetta and Reis (2001) estimate the largest root 
in the inflation process to have stably remained near one from 1960 to 2000. Because our 
focus is volatility,  not persistence,  we  do not pursue  this interesting  issue  further. Has the  Business  Cycle  Changed  and Why?  ? 171 
yt  =  at  (L)y  +  (L)t-  ,  (1) 
where 
aCI  +  (t(L),  t K-,  o2,  t  T, 
Oct  +  t(L)  =  .  and  Var(?,) = 
C  t  a2  +  t2(L),  t  >  K,  2/L,  t  >  T, 
where  ?1(L) and O2(L)  are lag polynomials  and  K and  T are break dates 
in, respectively,  the conditional  mean and the conditional  variance. This 
formulation allows  for the conditional mean and the conditional variance 
each to break (or not) at potentially  different dates. 
We use  the formulation  (1) to test for changes  in the AR parameters. 
First, the heteroscedasticity-robust  Quandt  (1960) likelihood  ratio (QLR) 
statistic  [also referred to as the sup-Wald  statistic; see Andrews  (1993)] 
is used to test for a break in the conditional mean. Throughout, QLR statis- 
tics are computed  for all potential  break dates in the central 70% of the 
sample.  We  test  for a break in  the  variance  at an unknown  date  T  by 
computing  the QLR statistic for a break in the mean of the absolute value 
of the residuals  from the estimated  autoregression  (1), where  the auto- 
regression allows  for a break in the AR parameters at the estimated break 
date K (see Appendix  A). Although  the QLR statistic is developed  for the 
single-break model, this test has power against other forms of time varia- 
tion such as drifting parameters (Stock and Watson, 1998): rejection of the 
no-break null  by  the QLR statistic is evidence  of time variation,  which 
may  or may not be of the single-break  form in (1). 
3.1.2 Estimated  Break  Dates and Confidence  Intervals  In addition  to testing 
for time-varying  AR parameters, in the event that the QLR statistic rejects 
at the 5% level  we  report OLS estimates  of the break dates  K (AR coeffi- 
cients)  and  T (innovation  variance),  and  67% confidence  intervals  com- 
puted  following  Bai (1997).4 
3.1.3 Results  Results  for the 22 series  are summarized  in Table 3. For 
GDP, the QLR statistic fails to reject the null  hypothesis  of no break in 
the coefficients  of the conditional  mean. In contrast, the null hypothesis 
of no break in the conditional  variance is rejected at the 1% significance 
level.  The break date is estimated  to be 1983:2, which  is consistent  with 
estimated  break dates reported by McConnell  and Perez-Quintos  (2001) 
4. The break estimator has a non-normal,  heavy-tailed  distribution,  so 95% intervals  com- 
puted using Bai's (1997) method are so wide  as to be uninformative.  We therefore deviate 
from convention  and report 67% confidence  intervals. Table  3  TESTS  FOR  CHANGES  IN  AUTOREGRESSIVE  PARAMETERS 
Conditional variance 
Conditional mean  Break only  Trend and break 
67%  67%  p-Value 
Break  Confidence  Break  Confidence  Break 
Series  p-Value  date  interval  p-Value  date  interval  Trend  Break  date 
GDP  0.98  0.00  1983:2  1982:4-1985:3  0.63  0.00  1983:2 
Consumption  0.55  0.00  1992:1  1991:3-1994:1  0.00  0.11 
Consumption-durables  0.04  1987:3  1987:1-1988:1  0.00  1987:3  1987:2-1990:2  0.68  0.03  1987:3 
Consumption-nondurables  0.00  1991:4  1991:2-1992:2  0.08  0.96  0.80 
Consumption-services  0.00  1969:4  1969:2-1970:2  0.18  0.03  0.00  1971:3 
Investment  (total)  0.05  0.13  0.06  0.25 
Fixed investment-total  0.69  0.01  1983:3  1983:1-1986:4  0.65  0.07 
Nonresidential  0.47  0.70  0.69  0.60 
Residential  0.10  0.00  1983:2  1983:1-1985:2  0.08  0.00  1983:2 
A(inventory  investment) /GDP  0.91  0.04  1988:1  1987:3-1992:2  0.00  0.10 
Exports  0.09  0.00  1975:4  1975:2-1978:2  0.95  0.75 
Imports  0.00  1972:4  1972:2-1973:2  0.00  1986:2  1986:1-1988:1  0.96  0.05  1986:2 
Goverment  spending  0.06  0.45  0.33  0.65 
Production 
Goods  (total)  0.92  0.00  1983:4  1983:2-1986:4  0.54  0.03  1983:3 
Nondurable  goods  0.09  0.00  1983:4  1983:3-1987:1  0.00  0.29 
Durable goods  0.77  0.02  1985:2  1984:3-1989:1  0.33  0.02  1985:2 
Services  0.00  1968:3  1968:1-1969:1  0.98  0.69  0.92 
Structures  0.02  1991:3  1991:1-1992:1  0.02  1984:2  1983:4-1988:1  0.42  0.03  1984:2 
Nonagricultural  employment  0.03  1981:2  1980:4-1981:4  0.00  1983:2  1982:4-1985:3  0.00  0.02  1973:3 
Price inflation  (GDP deflator)  0.00  1973:2  1972:4-1973:4  0.11  0.00  0.00  1971:2 
90-day T-bill rate  0.00  1981:1  1980:3-1981:3  0.01  1984:4  1984:2-1988:1  0.00  0.00  1984:4 
10-year T-bond rate  0.02  1981:1  1980:3-1981:3  0.00  1979:3  1972:2-1980:1  0.02  0.00  1979:3 
Notes:  The test results  are based on the QLR  test for the changes in the coefficients  of an AR(4).  The first column shows the p-value for the QLR-test  break  test statistic.  The 
second column  shows the least-squares  estimates  of the break date (when the QLR  statistic is significant at the 5%  level), and the final column shows the 67%  confidence 
interval  for the break  date. The results  in the "Conditional  Mean"  columns correspond  to the parameters  a and i in equation (1). The results in the "Conditional  Variance" 
columns  refer  to the variance  of e, in equation  (1), either with or without a time trend in the QLR  regression.  The tests are described  in more detail in Appendix A. Has the  Business  Cycle  Changed  and Why?  ? 173 
and Kim, Nelson,  and Piger (2001). The 67% confidence  interval for the 
break date  is precise,  1982:4-1985:3, although  (for reasons  discussed  in 
footnote  4) the 95% confidence  interval is rather wide,  1982:1-1989:4. 
The results for the components  of GDP indicate  that although  several 
series  (such  as the components  of consumption)  reveal  significant  time 
variation in the conditional-mean  coefficients,  the estimated  break dates 
and confidence intervals do not coincide with the timing of the reductions 
in volatility evident in Figure 2. In contrast, for ten of the seventeen  NIPA 
components  there are significant changes in the conditional variance, and 
for eight of those  ten series the break in the conditional  variance is esti- 
mated  to be in the mid-1980s.  Thus, like Kim, Nelson,  and Piger (2001), 
who  use  Bayesian  methods,  we  find  breaks  in  the  volatility  of  many 
components  of  GDP,  not  just  durable-goods  output  as  suggested  by 
McConnell  and  Perez-Quiros  (2000). Durables  consumption,  total fixed 
investment,  residential  investment,  imports,  goods  production,  and em- 
ployment  all exhibit significant breaks in their conditional  volatility with 
break dates estimated  in the mid-1980s. 
3.1.4 Estimates Based on the Stochastic Volatility Model  As  another check 
on  this  conclusion,  we  recalculated  the  estimates  of  the  instantaneous 
variance based on the stochastic volatility model  (the smooth lines in Fig- 
ure 2), with the restriction that the AR coefficients remain constant at their 
full-sample  OLS estimated  values.  The resulting estimated  instantaneous 
standard deviations  (not reported here) were visually  very close to those 
reported  in Figure 2. The most  substantial  differences  in the estimated 
instantaneous  variance  was  for price inflation,  in which  changes  in the 
conditional-mean  coefficients  in the 1960s contributed  to changes  in the 
estimated  standard deviation.  These results are consistent  with  the con- 
clusion  drawn  from Table 3 that the reduction  in the variance  of these 
series is attributable to a reduction  in the conditional  variance. 
3.1.5 Resultsfor Other  Series  Results for additional time series are summa- 
rized in Table 10 in Appendix  A. There is evidence  of widespread  instabil- 
ity in both the conditional  mean and the conditional  variance. Half of the 
168 series show  breaks in their conditional-mean  parameters  [consistent 
with the evidence  in Stock and Watson (1996)]. Strikingly, the hypothesis 
of a constant variance is rejected in two-thirds  of the series. Sensier and 
van Dijk (2001) find a similar result in their analysis of 215 U.S. macroeco- 
nomic time series. The breaks in the conditional means are mainly concen- 
trated in the 1970s. In contrast, the breaks in the conditional variances are 
concentrated  in the 1980s or, for some  series, the early 1990s. Thus, the 
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the 1980s and 1990s coincides with the estimated breaks in the conditional 
variance, not with  the estimated  breaks in the conditional  means. 
3.2 IS THE  MODERATION  A TREND  OR A BREAK? 
Kim and Nelson  (1999) and McConnell and Perez-Quiros (2000) modeled 
the  volatility  reduction  using  Markov  switching  models;  like  the  AR 
model  (1) with coefficient breaks, the Markov switching  model  treats the 
moderation  as a discrete  event,  which  they  independently  dated  as oc- 
curring in 1984:1.  After examining evidence on rolling standard deviations, 
however,  Blanchard and Simon  (2001) argued  that the volatility  reduc- 
tion was better viewed  as part of a longer trend decline, in which the high 
volatility  of the late 1970s and early 1980s was  a temporary aberration. 
To elucidate  this trend-vs.-break  debate, we  conduct  some  additional 
tests using  a model  that nests the two hypotheses.  Specifically, the QLR 
test for a change  in the standard deviation  in Section 3.1 was  modified 
so that the model  for the heteroscedasticity  includes  a time trend as well 
as the break. That is, the QLR test is based  on the regression  I tl =  70 + 
Ylt +  72dt(T) +  ilt,  where  dt(T)  is a binary variable that equals  1 if t -  T 
and equals zero otherwise,  and rl, is an error term; the modified  QLR test 
looks  for breaks for values  of T in the central 70% of the sample. 
The results are reported in the final columns  of Table 3. For GDP, the 
coefficient on the time trend is not statistically significantly different from 
zero, while  the hypothesis  of no break (maintaining  the possibility  of a 
time  trend in the standard  deviation)  is rejected at the  1% significance 
level.  The  estimated  break  date  in  GDP  volatility  is  1983:2, the  same 
whether a time trend is included in the specification or not. For GDP, then, 
this evidence  is consistent  with  the inference drawn from the estimated 
instantaneous  standard  deviation  plotted  in Figure 2: the sharp decline 
in the volatility  of GDP growth  in the mid-1980s is better described as a 
discrete reduction  in the variance than as part of a continuing  trend to- 
wards  lower  volatility. 
The results in Table 2 suggest  that the break model  is also appropriate 
for many of the components  of GDP, specifically nondurables  consump- 
tion, residential  fixed investment,  imports,  total goods  production,  pro- 
duction of durables, and production  of construction. For these series, the 
estimated  break dates  fall between  1983:2 and  1987:3. Consumption  of 
durables and production  of nondurables,  however,  seem to be better de- 
scribed by  the trend model.  A few  of the components  of GDP, such  as 
exports, are not well  described by either model. 
These conclusions  based on Table 2 are consistent with those based on 
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break, in the volatility  of GDP growth and some of its components,  most 
strikingly  residential  investment,  durable-goods  output,  and  output  of 
construction, while  other components  and time series show more compli- 
cated patterns of time-varying  volatility. 
3.3 MULTIVARIATE  ESTIMATES  OF BREAK  DATES 
In theory,  a common  break date can be estimated  much  more precisely 
when  multiple-equation  methods  are used  [see Hansen  (2001) for a re- 
view].  In this section,  we  therefore use  two  multivariate  methods  in an 
attempt  to refine the break-date confidence  intervals  of Section 3.1, one 
based  on  low-dimensional  VARs,  the  other  based  on  dynamic  factor 
models. 
3.3.1 Common  Breaks  in VARs  To estimate common breaks across multi- 
ple  series,  we  follow  Bai, Lumsdaine,  and  Stock (1998) and  extend  the 
univariate  autoregression  in (1) to a VAR. The procedure  is the same as 
described in Section 3.1, except that, to avoid overfitting, the VAR coeffi- 
cients  were  kept  constant.  The hypothesis  of no break is tested  against 
the alternative  of a common  break in the system  of equations  using  the 
QLR statistic computed  using  the absolute  values  of the VAR residuals. 
We also report the OLS estimator of the break date in the mean absolute 
residual and the associated  67% confidence  interval, computed  using the 
formulas  in Bai, Lumsdaine,  and Stock (1998). 
The results  for three different VARs are summarized  in Table 4. The 
first VAR decomposes  GDP by its end-use  components,  the second  de- 
Table  4  ESTIMATES  OF COMMON  BREAK  DATES  OF VARIANCES 
OF VAR RESIDUALS 
67% 
No. of  QLR  Break  Confidence 
Variables  variables  p-Value  date  interval 
Consumption,  investment,  5  0.01  1982:4  1981:1-1984:3 
exports, imports, government 
spending 
Output of: durables,  nondura-  4  0.00  1984:1  1982:3-1985:3 
bles, services, and structures 
Consumption  of durables,  con-  3  0.00  1983:2  1982:1-1984:3 
sumption of nondurables,  resi- 
dential fixed investment 
Notes: The estimated break dates and confidence intervals are computed  using the methods  in Bai, Lums- 
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composes  GDP by its production  components,  and the third focuses  on 
the more  durable components  of demand  by  individuals,  consumption 
of nondurables  and durables,  and residential  fixed investment.  In each, 
the hypothesis  of a constant  variance  is rejected at the  1% significance 
level.  The estimated  break dates  range from 1982:4 to 1984:1, with  67% 
confidence intervals that are tight and similar to the 67% confidence inter- 
val based  on the univariate  analysis  of GDP growth. 
3.3.2 Evidence  Based on Factor  Models  Dynamic  factor models  provide  a 
complementary  way to use information on multiple variables to estimate 
the volatility break date. Chauvet and Potter (2001) use Bayesian methods 
to analyze a dynamic factor model  of nine measures of economic  activity 
(including  GDP, industrial production,  consumption,  sales, and employ- 
ment).  Their model  allows  for breaks in the  autoregressive  coefficients 
and  variance  of  the  single  common  dynamic  factor. They  find  strong 
evidence  for a break in the variance of the common factor, and the poste- 
rior distribution  for the break date places almost all the mass in 1983 or 
1984. 
This analysis can be extended  to higher-dimensional  systems  by using 
the principal components  of the data to estimate the space spanned by the 
postulated  common  dynamic  factors (Stock and Watson, 2001). Previous 
empirical work  (Stock and Watson,  1999, 2001) has shown  that the first 
principal component  computed  using  the series such as those in Appen- 
dix B captures  a large fraction of the variation  in those  series,  and that 
the first principal component  can be thought  of as a real activity factor. 
Like GDP, this factor has a significant break in its conditional  variance, 
with  an estimated  break date of 1983:3 and a 67% confidence  interval of 
1983:2 to 1986:3. 
3.4 SUMMARY 
The results  in this  section  point  to instability  both  in conditional-mean 
functions and in conditional  variances. The weight  of the evidence,  how- 
ever,  suggests  that the  reductions  in  volatility  evident  in  Table  1 and 
Figure 2 are associated with changes in conditional  variances (error vari- 
ances), rather than changes  in conditional  means  (autoregressive  coeffi- 
cients). Analysis  of the full set of 168 series listed in Appendix  B provides 
evidence  of a widespread  reduction in volatility,  with the reduction gen- 
erally  dated  in  the  mid-1980s.  For most  series,  this  conclusion  is  un- 
changed  when  one allows  for the possibility  that the volatility  reduction 
could be part of a longer trend. Accordingly,  we  conclude  that for most 
series  the preferred  model  is one  of a distinct  reduction  in volatility  rather 
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This view  of a sharp moderation  rather than a trend decline is particu- 
larly appropriate for GDP and some of its more durable components.  Fol- 
lowing  McConnell and Perez-Quiros (2000), much of the literature focuses 
on declines in volatility in the production  of durable goods; however,  like 
Kim, Nelson,  and Piger (2001), we find significant reductions in volatility 
in other series.  Our results particularly point  to large reductions  in the 
variance of residential fixed investment  and output of structures, both of 
which  are highly  volatile.  The finding  of a break in volatility  in the mid- 
1980s is robust, and univariate and multivariate  confidence  intervals for 
the break date are tightly  centered around  1983 and 1984. 
4. Impulse  or Propagation? 
The univariate  analysis  of Section 3.1 suggests  that most  of the moder- 
ation  in volatility  of  GDP  growth  is  associated  with  a reduction  in its 
conditional  variance, not changes  in its conditional  mean.  But does  this 
conclusion  hold  when  multiple  sources  of information  are used  to com- 
pute  the  conditional  mean  of  output  growth?  Several  recent  studies 
(Ahmed,  Levin,  and  Wilson  2001; Boivin  and  Giannoni,  2002a; 2002b; 
Primiceri (2002); Simon, 2000) have examined  this question  using  vector 
autoregressions,  and we adopt this approach here. Specifically, in the con- 
text of reduced-form  VARs, is the observed  reduction in volatility  associ- 
ated  with  a  change  in  the  magnitude  of  the  VAR  forecast  errors (the 
impulses), in the lag dynamics modeled  by the VAR (propagation),  or both? 
4.1 THE  COUNTERFACTUAL  VAR METHOD 
Because  the  results  of Sections  3.2 and  3.3 point  to  a distinct  break in 
volatility  in 1983 or 1984, in this section we impose  the break date 1984:1 
found by Kim and Nelson  (1999) and McConnell and Perez-Quiros (2000). 
Accordingly,  we  use reduced-form  VARs estimated  over 1960-1983  and 
1984-2001  to estimate how  much of the reduction in the variance of GDP 
is due to changes in the VAR coefficients and how much is due to changes 
in the innovation  covariance matrix. Each VAR has the form 
Xt  =  <i(L)Xt_-  +  ut,  Var(u)  =  i,,  (2) 
where  Xt is a vector  time  series  and  the subscript  i  =  1, 2 denotes  the 
first and second  subsample  [the intercept is omitted  in (2) for notational 
convenience  but  is included  in the estimation].  Let Bij  be  the matrix of 
coefficients  of  the  jth  lag  in  the  matrix  lag  polynomial  Bi(L) =  [I  - 178 . STOCK & WATSON 
4)i(L)L]-'.  With this notation, the variance of the kth series in Xt in the ith 
period  is 
Var(Xkt)  = B(  j  Bi,B  =Ck(cI,  ,)2.  (3) 
j-Q  kk 
By evaluating  the expression  in (3) for different  D and X, it is possible 
to compute  the counterfactual variance of Xkt  that would  have arisen had 
either  D or Z taken  on  different  values.  For example  c(k(4)l,  1) is  the 
standard deviation of Xkt  in period 1, and ok(02,  1)  is the standard devia- 
tion of Xkt  that would  have occurred had the lag dynamics been those of 
the second  period  and the error covariance matrix been  that of the first 
period. Although  these expressions  are based on the population  parame- 
ters, the various counterfactuals can be estimated by replacing the popula- 
tion parameters with  sample  estimators. 
4.2 RESULTS 
The results are summarized  in Table 5, where, for comparability with the 
previous  tables, the quarterly variances have been temporally aggregated 
to pertain to annual growth rates of quarterly variables. Table 5a presents 
results  for a four-variable VAR(4) benchmark model  consisting  of GPD 
growth,  the first difference  of inflation (measured  by the GDP deflator), 
the federal funds rate, and the growth rate of commodity  prices. The first 
two  columns  provide  the sample  standard deviations  of the various  se- 
ries, and the final four columns  provide  the VAR-based estimates  of the 
standard  deviations  for the four possible  permutations  of estimated  lag 
coefficients  and covariance  matrices. The columns  labeled  c(01,  Si)  and 
C(42,  /  2) respectively  contain  the VAR-based  estimate  of the  first- and 
second-period  sample standard deviations,  which  (as they should be) are 
quite  close  to  the  respective  sample  standard  deviations.  The columns 
labeled  c(01,, 12) and ao(02,  1)  contain the counterfactual estimates. 
First consider  the results for GDP. The counterfactual  combination  of 
second-period  dynamics  and first-period  shocks  [that is,  a(4)2,  1)]  pro- 
duces an estimated standard deviation  of 2.63, essentially  the same as the 
first-period standard deviation. In contrast, the first-period dynamics  and 
second-period  shocks  produce  an estimated  standard  deviation  of  1.48, 
essentially  the same as the second-period  standard deviation.  According 
to these estimates, had the shocks of the 1970s occurred in the 1990s, the 
1990s would  have been almost as volatile  as the 1970s. Similarly, had the 
shocks  of  the  1990s occurred  in the  1970s, the  1970s would  have  been 
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Table 5  IMPLIED STANDARD  DEVIATIONS OF FOUR-QUARTER GDP 
GROWTH FROM SUBSAMPLE VARs 
Xt  =  D(L)Xt  -1  +  Ut,  Var(ut)  =  E 
First sample  period: 1960-1983  [estimated  parameters  11(L)  and El] 
Second  sample  period: 1984-2001 [estimated  parameters 42(L) and  2] 
(a) Four-Variable Benchmark Specification  [VAR(4) with  GDP Growth, 
Change in Inflation, Federal Funds Rate, and the Growth Rate 




1960-  1984- 
1983  2001  Variable 
Standard  deviation offour-quarter GDP 
growth implied by the VAR 
(Ti2,  ?1) 
GDP growth  2.71  1.59  2.76  1.43  1.48  2.63 
Inflation  1.49  0.59  1.52  0.57  0.95  0.92 
Federal funds  rate  2.64  1.47  2.67  1.48  1.35  3.03 
(b) Sensitivity  Analysis:  Alternative  Specifications 
Deviation  from benchmark 
specification  o(4i,  1)  (62,  2)  o(T,  12)  (D2  X1) 
First period  is 1960-1978  2.52  1.43  1.46  2.58 
VAR(6)  2.78  1.37  1.59  2.45 
Levels instead  of first differences  2.65  1.61  1.43  2.87 
1-year Treasury bill rate instead 
of FF rate  2.72  1.41  1.42  2.73 
Alternative  commodity  price 
index (PPI for crude materials)  2.76  1.46  2.13  2.60 
Alternative  commodity  price 
index  (Index of sensitive  mat. 
prices)  2.74  1.44  1.68  2.50 
Commodity  prices dropped  2.76  1.47  1.34  2.68 
GDP replaced with  goods 
output  3.94  2.68  2.55  4.08 
GDP replaced  with  goods  sales  3.00  2.23  2.25  3.00 
Monthly  data (using  IP and CPI)  5.50  3.13  3.25  5.53 
Note: Entries are various  estimates  of the square root of the variance of the four-quarter growth in GDP. 
In the base VAR specification, commodity  prices are an index of spot prices, all commodities  (PSCCOM). 
The alternative commodity  price indexes  are PWCMSA and PSM99Q. 
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matrix of the unforecastable  components  of the VARs-the  impulses- 
account  for virtually  all  of  the  reduction  in  the  observed  volatility  of 
output. 
4.3 SENSITIVITY  ANALYSIS  AND COMPARISON  WITH 
THE  LITERATURE 
The sensitivity  of this  finding  to changes  in the model  specification  or 
assumptions  is investigated  in Table 5b. The conclusion  from the bench- 
mark model-that  it is impulses,  not shocks, that are associated with the 
variance reduction-is  robust to most changes reported in that table. For 
example,  similar results  obtain when  the first period  is changed  to end 
in 1978 (the second period remains 1984-2001); when  log GDP, inflation, 
and  the  interest  rate are used  rather than  their first differences;  when 
monthly  data are used; and when  GDP is replaced with goods  output or 
sales.  Dropping  the  commodity  spot  price  index  does  not  change  the 
results, nor does  using  an alternative index  of sensitive-materials  prices 
[a smoothed  version  of which  is used  by  Christiano, Eichenbaum,  and 
Evans (1999)]. Curiously,  however,  replacing the commodity  price index 
by the produce  price index  for crude materials does  change  the conclu- 
sions somewhat,  giving  some role to propagation. The weight  of this evi- 
dence,  however,  suggests  that changes  in  the  propagation  mechanism 
play  at most  a modest  role  in  explaining  the  moderation  of  economic 
activity. 
The substantive  conclusions  drawn  from Table 5 are similar to Primi- 
ceri's  (2002), Simon's  (2000), and  (for the same  sample  periods)  Boivin 
and  Giannoni's  (2002a, 2002b). Ahmed,  Levin,  and  Wilson  (2002) con- 
clude  that most  of the reduction  in variance stems  from smaller shocks, 
but give some weight to changes in the propagation mechanism. The main 
source of the difference between  our results and theirs appears to be that 
Ahmed,  Levin, and Wilson (2002) measure commodity  prices by the pro- 
ducer price index  for crude materials. 
4.4 CONCLUSIONS 
The estimates in Table 5 suggest  that most, if not all, of the reductions in 
the variance of the four-quarter growth of GDP are attributable to changes 
in the covariance  matrix of the  reduced-form  VAR innovations,  not  to 
changes in the VAR lag coefficients  (the propagation  mechanism).  These 
changes in reduced-form VAR innovations  could arise either from reduc- 
tions in the variance of certain structural shocks or from changes in how 
those shocks impact the economy,  notably through changes  in the struc- 
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to move  beyond  reduced-form  data description  and consider  structural 
economic  models,  a task taken up in the next section. 
5. Explanations  for the Great  Moderation 
What accounts  for the moderation  in the volatility  of GDP growth  and, 
more generally,  for the empirical evidence  documented  in Sections 2-4? 
In this section,  we  consider  five  potential  explanations.  The first is that 
the reduction  in volatility  can be traced to a change in the sectoral com- 
position  of output  away  from durable  goods.  The second  potential  ex- 
planation,  proposed  by  McConnell  and Perez-Quiros  (2000), is that the 
reduction  in volatility  is due  to new  and better inventory  management 
practices. The third possibility  emphasizes  the volatility reduction in resi- 
dential  fixed  investment.  The fourth  candidate  explanation  is  that the 
structural shocks  to the  economy  are smaller  than they  once  were: we 
simply  have had good  luck. Finally, we  consider  the possibility  that the 
reduction  in volatility  is, at least in part, attributable to better macroeco- 
nomic  policy,  in particular better policymaking  by  the Federal Reserve 
Board. 
5.1 CHANGES  IN THE  SECTORAL  COMPOSITION 
The service sector is less cyclically sensitive  than the manufacturing  sec- 
tor, so, as suggested  by  Burs  (1960) and Moore and Zamowitz  (1986), 
the shift in the United  States from manufacturing  to services should  lead 
to  a reduction  in  the  variability  of  GDP. Blanchard and  Simon  (2001), 
McConnell  and Perez-Quiros  (2000), and Wamock  and Wamock  (2001) 
investigated  this hypothesis  and concluded  that this sectoral shift hypoth- 
esis does not explain the reduction in volatility. The essence of Blanchard 
and Simon's  (2001) and McConnell  and Perez-Quiros's  (2000) argument 
is summarized  in Table 6a. The standard deviation of annual GDP growth 
fell from 2.7% during 1960-1983 to 1.6%  during 1984-2001; when the out- 
put subaggregates  of durables, nondurables,  services, and structures are 
combined  using  constant  1965 shares, the resulting  standard  deviations 
for the two  periods  are 3.1% and  1.8%. Thus,  autonomously  fixing  the 
output  shares of the different sectors yields  essentially  the same decline 
in the standard  deviation  of GDP growth  as using  the actual, changing 
shares. Mechanically,  the reason for this is that the volatility  of output in 
the different sectors has declined  across the board. Moreover, the sectors 
with  the greatest volatility-durables  and structures-also  have  output 
shares that are essentially  constant. 
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Table  6  THE  EFFECT  OF CHANGING  SECTORAL  COMPOSITION  ON THE 
VARIANCE  OF GDP AND AGGREGATE  EMPLOYMENT 
Standard  deviation  Shares 
Sector  1960-1983  1984-2001  1960  2001 
(a) GDP 
GDP (actual)  .027  .016 
GDP (1965  shares)  .031  .018 
Durables  .084  .053  .18  .18 
Nondurables  .030  .018  .31  .19 
Services  .012  .008  .39  .53 
Structures  .072  .048  .11  .09 
(b) Aggregate  Employment 
Total (actual)  .020  .013 
Total (1965  shares)  .022  .014 
Mining  .075  .059  .013  .004 
Construction  .053  .045  .054  .051 
Durable  man.  .056  .028  .174  .085 
Nondurable  man.  .026  .014  .136  .056 
Trans.  & util.  .023  .014  .074  .053 
Trade  .017  .017  .210  .230 
FIRE  .013  .020  .049  .057 
Services  .011  .012  .136  .307 
Government  .019  .008  .154  .157 
Notes:  The  first  row  of each  part  shows the  standard  deviation  of the  four-quarter  changes  in the  aggregate 
series. The next row shows the standard  deviation of the 1965-share-weighted  share of four-quarter 
changes  in the disaggregated  series shown in the other  rows of the table. 
looks instead at employment  growth: the standard deviation  of employ- 
ment  growth  falls by  approximately  one-third  whether  one  uses  actual 
employment  shares or constant  employment  shares. Here, as discussed 
further by Warnock and Wamock  (2001), it is not just that employment 
is migrating from a more volatile to a less volatile sector; rather, the vola- 
tility of employment  within construction and manufacturing has itself de- 
clined.5 Finally, the structural-shift hypothesis  has a timing problem: the 
shift away  from manufacturing  has taken place gradually  over the past 
5. A caveat on these accounting-identity  calculations is that they ignore general-equilibrium 
effects of a switch to service production. If, for example, increased stability of employment 
in services results in more stable incomes,  then an increase in the share of services could 
in equilibrium stabilize demand  for all products, including  goods  and construction. If so, 
the mechanical calculation in Table 6 could understate the moderating  effect of a shift to 
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four decades, whereas the analysis of Sections 2-4  suggests  a sharp mod- 
eration in volatility  in the mid-1980s. 
5.2 CHANGES  IN INVENTORY  MANAGEMENT 
McConnell  and Perez-Quiros  (2000) proposed  that new  inventory  man- 
agement  methods,  such  as just-in-time  inventory  management,  are the 
source of the reduction  in volatility  in GDP; this argument is elaborated 
upon by Kahn, McConnell and Perez-Quiros (2001, 2002). The essence  of 
their argument  is that the volatility  of production  in manufacturing  fell 
sharply in the mid-1980s, but the volatility  of sales did not; they found a 
statistically  significant break in output variability, especially  in durables 
manufacturing,  but not in sales variability. They concluded  that changes 
in inventory  management  must  account for this discrepancy.  Moreover, 
they suggested  that the decline in the variance of goods  production  fully 
accounts for the statistical significance  of the decline  in GDP, so that un- 
derstanding  changes in inventory behavior holds  the key to understand- 
ing the moderation in GDP volatility. Unlike the sectoral-shift hypothesis, 
timing works in favor of this inventory-management  hypothesis,  for new 
inventory  management  methods  relying heavily  on information technol- 
ogy  gained  popularity  during  the 1980s. 
This bold  conjecture-that  micro-level  changes  in inventory  manage- 
ment  could  have  major macroeconomic  consequences-has  received  a 
great deal of attention.  Our reading  of this research suggests,  however, 
that upon  closer inspection  the inventory-management  hypothesis  does 
not fare well.  The first set of difficulties  pertain to the facts themselves. 
The stylized  fact that production  volatility  has fallen but sales volatility 
has not is not robust to the method  of analysis used  or the series consid- 
ered. Ahmed,  Levin, and Wilson  (2002) find statistically  significant  evi- 
dence  of a break in final sales in 1983:3 using  the Bai-Perron  (1998) test; 
Herrera and Pesavento  (2002) use  the QLR test and find a break in the 
variance of the growth of sales in nondurables  manufacturing  (estimated 
by least squares to be in 1983:3) and in durables manufacturing  (in 1984: 
1), as well as in many two-digit  sectors; and Kim, Nelson,  and Piger (2001) 
find evidence  of a decline in volatility of aggregate final sales and in dura- 
ble goods  sales using  Bayesian methods. 
Our break-test results  for sales  (see Table 10) are consistent  with  this 
more recent literature: we  find statistically significant breaks in the vari- 
ance of total final sales and final sales of durable goods. Like Kim, Nelson, 
and Piger (2001), we date the break in the variance of durable-goods  sales 
to  the  early  1990s, whereas  the break in  the  variance  of production  is 
dated  to the mid-1980s.  Although  the confidence  intervals  for the break 
dates in durables production and sales are wide, the 67%  confidence inter- 184  STOCK  & WATSON 
Figure  3 DURABLE-GOODS  PRODUCTION  AND SALES:  TIME-VARYING 
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val for the durable-sales break date does not include  the mid-1980s. Fig- 
ure 3 presents the estimated instantaneous variances, computed  using the 
non-Gaussian  smoother  described  in Appendix  A,  for the  four-quarter 
growth in durables production  and sales. Both series have a complicated 
pattern of time-varying volatility, but the decline in volatility in the 1980s 
and 1990s is evident  for both series (as is the mismatch  in the timing of 
this decline).6 
An  additional  challenge  for the inventory-management  hypothesis  is 
that the finding that the variance of production has fallen proportionately 
more than the variance of sales is sensitive  to the frequency  of the data 
considered. As seen in the first columns of Table 7, the standard deviation 
of  the  quarterly  growth  of  production  in  durables  manufacturing  fell 
6. The variance of final sales of nondurable goods has also experienced a statistically signifi- 
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Table 7  STANDARD  DEVIATIONS OF GROWTH OF PRODUCTION, 
SALES, AND  INVENTORIES 
One-quarter  growth  Four-quarter  growth 
S1984-2001/  S1984-2001/ 
Series  S 1960-1983  S 1984-2001  S 1960-1983  S 1960-1983  S 1984-2001  S 1960-1983 
GDP  4.32  2.18  .51  2.71  1.59  .59 
Total goods: 
Production  7.78  4.58  .59  4.12  2.87  .70 
Sales  5.14  3.93  .76  3.05  2.01  .66 
AI  / sales  6.22  4.50  .72  2.09  1.95  .94 
Durable goods: 
Production  17.25  8.06  .47  8.46  5.28  .62 
Sales  9.86  7.83  .79  5.67  3.67  .65 
AI/sales  12.10  8.17  .68  4.15  3.15  .76 
Nondurable  goods: 
Production  7.41  4.69  .63  2.96  1.81  .61 
Sales  4.50  2.88  .64  2.35  1.41  .60 
AI/sales  6.55  3.97  .61  1.89  1.59  .84 
Services production  1.71  1.38  .81  1.18  0.80  .68 
Structures production  11.80  6.71  .57  7.16  4.79  .67 
Notes:  S1960-1983  denotes the standard  deviation computed using the 1960-1983  data, etc. One-quarter 
growth rates are computed as 4001n(X,/X_  ), where X, is sales (etc.), except for AI/sales, which is 
computed  as 400 times its quarterly  first difference  (400AX,).  Four-quarter  growth rates  are computed 
as 1001n(X,/X,  _), except for AI/sales, which is computed  as 100 times its fourth  difference  [100(X,  - 
X,-4)]. 
sharply  in  the  latter  period,  whereas  the  standard  deviation  of  sales  fell 
proportionately  less:  the  standard  deviation  of quarterly  growth  of dura- 
ble  goods  sales  in the  second  period  is 79% what  it was  in the  first period, 
while  the  standard  deviation  of  quarterly  growth  of  durable  goods  pro- 
duction  in  the  second  period  was  47%  of  its  first-period  value.7  As  the 
second  set  of  columns  show,  however,  this  disproportionate  decline  dis- 
appears  at  longer  horizons:  when  one  considers  four-quarter  growth 
rather  than  one-quarter  growth,  the  standard  deviations  of  production 
and  sales  fell by  essentially  the  same  amount.8  Indeed,  the  striking  feature 
of  the  final  column  of  Table  7a  is  that  the  standard  deviation  of  four- 
quarter  growth  in sales  and  production  fell  by  30% to 40% across  all pro- 
7. The  entries  in first  columns  of Table  7 closely match  those in Table  4 of Kahn,  McConnell, 
and Perez-Quiros  (2002),  with slight differences  presumably  attributable  to different  sam- 
ple periods and different  vintages of data. 
8. This is true for other degrees  of temporal aggregation.  For one-quarter growth, the ratio 
of the relative  standard  deviations  of durables  output  to durables  sales  growth  is .79/ 
.47 =  1.70; for two-quarter growth, it falls to 1.35; for three-, four-, six-, and eight-quarter 
growth,  it is respectively  1.15, 1.04, 1.00, and 1.01. 186 . STOCK & WATSON 
duction  sectors:  durables,  nondurables,  services,  and  structures.  This 
suggests  that, to  the  extent  that information  technology  has  facilitated 
using  inventories  to smooth  production,  this effect is one  of smoothing 
across months or across adjacent quarters. At the longer horizons of inter- 
est in business-cycle  analysis,  such as the four-quarter growth rates con- 
sidered  in this paper,  the declines  in volatility  of production  and  sales 
have been  effectively  proportional,  suggesting  no role for improved  in- 
ventory  management  in reducing  volatility  at longer horizons. 
The inventory-management  hypothesis  confronts  other difficulties  as 
well. As emphasized  by Blinder and Maccini (1991) and Ramey and West 
(1999), most inventories  in manufacturing  are raw materials or work-in- 
progress  inventories,  which  do not play  a role in production  smoothing 
(except avoiding  raw-material stockouts).  One would  expect inventory- 
sales ratios to decline if information technology  has an important impact 
on aggregate inventories; however,  inventory-sales  ratios have declined 
primarily for raw materials and work-in-progress  inventories,  and in fact 
have  risen  for finished-goods  inventories  and  for retail and  wholesale 
trade inventories.  Information technology  may have improved  the man- 
agement  of finished-goods  inventories,  but this improvement  is not re- 
flected in a lower  inventory-sales  ratio for finished  goods. 
Ramey and Vine (2001) offer a different explanation  of the relative de- 
cline in the variance of production  at high  frequencies,  relative to sales. 
They suggest  that a modest reduction in the variance of sales can be mag- 
nified  into  a large  reduction  in  the  variance  of production  because  of 
nonconvexities  in plant-level  cost functions. In their example,  a small re- 
duction in the variance of auto sales means that sales fluctuations can be 
met  through  overtime  rather than by  (for example)  adding  temporary 
shifts,  thereby  sharply  reducing  the  variance  of output  and  employee- 
hours. 
None  of this evidence  is decisive.  Still, in our view  it suggests  that the 
reduction of volatility is too widespread  across sectors and across produc- 
tion  and  sales  (especially  at longer  horizons)  to be  consistent  with  the 
view  that inventory  management  plays  a central role in explaining  the 
economywide  moderation  in volatility. 
5.3 RESIDENTIAL  HOUSING 
Although  residential  fixed investment  constitutes  a small share of GDP, 
historically  it has been highly  volatile  and procyclical. The estimated  in- 
stantaneous variance of the four-quarter growth in residential investment 
is 14.2 percentage points in 1981, but this falls to 6.0 percentage points in 
1985. As is evident  in Figure 2, even after weighting  by its small share in 
GDP, the standard deviation  fell during the mid-1980s by approximately Has the  Business  Cycle  Changed  and Why?  * 187 
the same amount as did the share-weighted  standard deviation of durable- 
goods  output. 
Figure 4 presents  estimated  instantaneous  standard  deviations  of the 
four-quarter growth  of various  series relating to the construction  sector 
(these plots  are comparable  to those  in Figure 2, except that Figure 2 is 
share-weighted  whereas  Figure 4 is not). The sharp decline  in volatility 
in the mid-1980s is evident  in the residential-sector real activity measures 
Figure  4 TIME-VARYING  STANDARD  DEVIATIONS 
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of building  permits, housing  starts, and real private residential construc- 
tion put in place. In contrast, nonresidential  construction does  not show 
any volatility reduction: the variance of real industrial construction is ap- 
proximately  constant, while  the variance of real commercial construction 
is constant and then increases slightly during the 1990s. As noted by War- 
nock  and  Warock  (2001),  employment  in  total  contract  construction 
(which  includes  residential  and nonresidential)  also  shows  a decline  in 
volatility,  although  it is not as sharp as for the output measures. Intrigu- 
ingly,  the  decline  in  volatility  of  purchases  of  residential  structures  is 
more distinct for single-unit  than for multiunit  residences. 
There are a variety of potential explanations  for this marked decline in 
volatility in the residential sector. One explanation emphasizes  structural 
changes in the market for home loans. As discussed  in detail by McCarthy 
and Peach (2002), the mortgage market underwent  substantial regulatory 
and institutional changes in the 1970s and 1980s. These changes included 
the introduction of adjustable-rate mortgages, the development  of the sec- 
ondary  market  for bundled  mortgages,  and  the  decline  of  thrifts  and 
growth  of nonthrift lenders. To the extent that these changes  reduced  or 
eliminated  credit rationing from the mortgage market, so that mortgages 
became generally available at the stated interest rate for qualified borrow- 
ers, they could  have worked  to reduce the volatility  of demand  for new 
housing.  According  to this explanation,  this autonomous  decline  in the 
volatility  of residential investment  in turn spills over into a reduction of 
volatility  of aggregate  demand.  A difficulty with  this explanation,  how- 
ever, is that these institutional  developments  took time, and the drop in 
volatility  observed  in Figure 4 is quite sharp. Moreover, McCarthy and 
Peach (2002) present evidence  that although the impulse response of resi- 
dential  investment  to a monetary  shock  changed  in the mid-1980s,  the 
ultimate effect of a monetary shock on residential investment  was essen- 
tially unchanged; their results are, however, based on a Cholesky-factored 
VAR, and without  a structural identification  scheme they are hard to in- 
terpret. Additional  work  is needed  to ascertain if there is a relation be- 
tween  the developments  in the mortgage  market and the stabilization  of 
real activity in residential  construction.9 
9. U.S.  financial  markets  generally,  not just  mortgage  markets,  developed  substantially  from 
the 1970s  to 1990s.  Blanchard  and Simon (2001)  suggest that increased  consumer  access 
to credit and equity ownership  could have facilitated  intertemporal  smoothing  of con- 
sumption,  which in turn led to a reduction  in aggregate  volatility.  Bekaert,  Harvey,  and 
Lundblad  (2002)  report  empirical  evidence  based on international  data  that  countries  that 
liberalize  equity markets  experience  a subsequent  reduction  in the volatility  of economic 
growth. In the U.S., however, general financial  market  developments,  like those in the 
mortgage  market,  took place over decades,  whereas  we estimate  a sharp  volatility  reduc- 
tion in the mid-1980s:  it seems the timing of the financial  market  developments  in the 
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Other explanations  suggest  a more passive  role for housing,  that is, the 
reduction  in housing  volatility  could  be  a response  to the reduction  in 
general shocks to the economy.  For example,  if the decision  to purchase 
a home is based in part on expected future income, and if expected future 
income  is less  volatile,  then home  investment  should  be less  volatile.  A 
difficulty  with  this  explanation  is  that, although  the  volatility  of  four- 
quarter GDP growth  has diminished,  it is not clear that the volatility  of 
changes  in permanent income has fallen. In fact, if there is a break in the 
variance of consumption  of services, it is in the early 1970s and we do not 
find a statistically  significant break in durables  consumption  (see Table 
3). To the extent  that nondurables  consumption  is a scaled  measure  of 
permanent  income,  the variance of permanent income  does not exhibit a 
statistically significant break in the 1980s. This argument is quantified by 
Kim, Nelson,  and Piger (2001), who  in fact conclude  that the reduction 
in the variance of GDP growth  is associated  with  a decrease in the vari- 
ance of its cyclical, but not its long-run,  component. 
A related candidate explanation  emphasizes  the role of mortgage rates 
rather than expected  incomes:  the reduction  in volatility  of housing  in- 
vestment  reflects reduced volatility  of expected  real long-term rates. This 
is consistent with the reduction in the volatility  of long and short interest 
rates in Figure 2, at least relative  to the late 1970s and early 1980s. It is 
also consistent  with  the reduction in the volatility  of durable-goods  con- 
sumption,  sales,  and production,  which  in part entail debt financing by 
consumers.  To investigate  this hypothesis,  however,  one would  need  to 
develop  measures  of the expected  variance of the ex ante real mortgage 
rate, to see how these measures changed during the 1980s, and to integrate 
this  into  a model  of housing  investment-topics  that are left to future 
work. 
5.4 SMALLER  SHOCKS 
The reduced-form VAR analysis of Section 4 suggested  that most, possibly 
all, of the decline  in the variance  of real GDP growth  is attributable to 
changes  in  the  covariance  matrix of  the  VAR innovations.  In this  sec- 
tion,  we  attempt  to pinpoint  some  specific  structural shocks  that have 
moderated. We consider five types of shocks: money shocks, fiscal shocks, 
productivity  shocks,  oil  price  shocks,  and  shocks  to  other  commodity 
prices. 
5.4.1 Money Shocks  Over the past  fifteen years,  there has been  consid- 
erable  research  devoted  to  identifying  shocks  to  monetary  policy  and 
to measuring  their effects  on  the macroeconomy.  Two  well-known  ap- 
proaches,  both using  structural VARs but different identifying  assump- 190 *  STOCK  & WATSON 
tions, are Bemanke and Mihov (1998) (BM) and Christiano, Eichenbaum, 
and Evans (1997) (CEE) [see Christiano, Eichenbaum,  and Evans (1999) 
for a survey]. Using  structural VARs, we have implemented  the BM and 
CEE identification strategies and computed  the implied  money  shocks in 
the early  (pre-1984) and  late (post-1984) sample  periods.  Our specifica- 
tions  are the same  as used  by  those  authors,  although  we  extend  their 
datasets.10  Bernanke and Mihov suggest  that monetary policy shifted over 
the  sample  period,  so  we  include  a specification  that incorporates  this 
shift. 
The standard  deviation  of  the  BM and  CEE monetary  shocks  in the 
1984-2001  sample period, relative to the standard deviation  in the earlier 
period, are reported in the first block of Table 8. Since the money  shocks 
were very volatile  during  1979-1983,  results are shown  for early sample 
periods  that include  and  that exclude  1979-1983.  The results  suggest  a 
marked decrease in the variability of monetary shocks for both CEE and 
BM identifications.  The relative standard deviations  over  1984-2001  are 
roughly  0.50 when  the early sample  includes  1979-1983,  and 0.75 when 
that period  is excluded. 
5.4.2 Fiscal Shocks  Blanchard and Perotti (2001) identify  shocks to taxes 
and government  spending  using  a VAR together with  an analysis  of the 
automatic responses  of these variables to changes  in real income and in- 
flation. The next two rows of Table 8 show results for their shocks.1 There 
has been some moderation  in both shocks; the standard deviation  of tax 
shocks has fallen by approximately  20%. 
5.4.3 Productivity  Shocks  Standard measures of productivity  shocks, such 
as the Solow residual, suffer from measurement problems from variations 
in capacity  utilization,  imperfect  competition,  and other sources.  While 
there have  been  important  improvements  in  methods  and  models  for 
measuring  productivity  (for example,  see  Basu,  Ferald,  and  Kimball, 
1999), there does not seem to be a widely  accepted series on productivity 
shocks  suitable  for our purposes.  Instead  we  have  relied  on  a method 
suggested  by Gali (1999) that, like the money  and fiscal shocks, is based 
on  a structural VAR. In particular, Gali associates  productivity  shocks 
with  those  components  of the VAR that lead  to permanent  changes  in 
10. In our version of BM we use industrial production  instead of their monthly interpolated 
GDP, because their series, and the related series in Bemanke, Gertler, and Watson (1997), 
end in 1997. 
11. We thank Roberto Perotti for supplying  us with the data and computer programs used 
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Table 8  CHANGES  IN THE  STANDARD  DEVIATION  OF VARIOUS 
MACROECONOMIC  SHOCKS 
Relative 
contribution  to 
perod2 GDP variance 
Shock  Period  1  Period  2  Speriod  1  reduction 
Monetary  policy: 
Christiano-Eichenbaum-Evans  60:1-83:4  84:1-01:3  0.50  0.10 
Christiano-Eichenbaum-Evans  60:1-78:4  84:1-01:3  0.76  0.00 
Bemanke-Mihov-1 (monthly)  66:1-83:4  84:1-01:9  0.57  0.23* 
Bemanke-Mihov-1  (monthly)  66:1-78:12 84:1-01:9  0.75  0.27* 
Beranke-Mihov-2 (monthly)  66:1-83:12 84:1-01:9  0.39  0.16* 
Beranke-Mihov-2 (monthly)  66:1-78:4  84:1-01:9  0.62  0.05* 
Fiscal  policy: 
Taxes (Blanchard-Perotti)  60:1-83:4  84:1-97:4  0.83  0.02 
Spending (Blanchard-Perotti)  60:1-83:4  84:1-97:4  0.94  0.03 
Productivity: 
Gali  60:1-83:4  84:1-01:3  0.75  0.15 
Oil prices: 
Nominal price  60:1-83:4  84:1-01:3  2.80  -0.12 
Real price  60:1-83:4  84:1-01:3  2.98  -0.15 
Hamilton  60:1-83:4  84:1-01:3  1.09  0.05 
Commodity  prices: 
All  60:1-83:4  84:1-01:3  0.73  0.18 
Food  60:1-83:4  84:1-01:3  0.75  0.07 
Industrial-material  prices  60:1-83:4  84:1-01:3  0.78  0.13 
Sensitive-material  prices  60:1-83:4  84:1-01:3  0.78  0.14 
Notes:  Standard  deviations  were computed  for each of the shocks listed in the first column over the 
sample periods listed in the second and third columns.  The relative  standard  deviation  shown in the 
third column is the period-2  standard  deviation  divided by the period-1  standard  deviation.  The final 
column shows the fraction  of the reduction  in output variance  associated  with the change in shock 
variance.  For the quarterly  series the output series is the annual  growth rate of annual  GDP. For the 
monthly  series marked  * the output series is the annual  growth  rate of the index of industrial  produc- 
tion. Beranke-Mihov-1 corresponds  to shocks  estimated  in the Bemanke-Mihov  model with constant 
coefficients  over the full sample  period.  Bemanke-Mihov-2  shocks  allow the coefficients  to differ  in the 
two sample periods.  See the text for description  of the shocks. 
labor productivity.  Gali's (1999) productivity  shock shows  a 25% reduc- 
tion in its standard deviation  in the second  sample  period. 
5.4.4  Oil Price Shocks  The  next  three  rows  show  results  for  oil  price 
shocks. The first two rows  measure oil shocks by quarterly growth  rates 
in nominal  and real oil prices. Since oil prices were  much more variable 
in  the  post-1984  sample  period,  these  measures  show  a larger relative 
standard deviation  in the second  sample period. Hamilton  (1996) argues 
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the larger of zero and the percentage difference between  the current price 
and the maximum price during the past year. Using Hamilton's measure, 
there has been essentially  no change in the variability of oil shocks across 
the two  sample  periods. 
5.4.5 Other Commodity  Price Shocks  The final four rows  show  results for 
broader commodity  price  measures:  an aggregate  index  of  commodity 
prices  (the same  measure  often  included  in VAR models),  an index  for 
food, an index for industrial materials, and an index for sensitive materials. 
Results are shown  for nominal  growth rates (commodity  price inflation); 
the results for real growth rates are essentially identical. These series show 
a marked reduction in volatility, with standard deviations falling between 
20% and 30% in the second  sample period relative to the first period. 
5.4.6 Importance  of These Reductions  Whether the reductions  in the vari- 
ances of the structural shocks can explain the moderation in GDP depends 
on  the  importance  of  these  shocks  in  determining  output  growth.  The 
final column of Table 8 reports the fraction of the reduction in the variance 
of four-quarter GDP growth  that is explained  by the change in the vari- 
ance of the shock in that row. For example,  the reduction in the variance 
of the CEE monetary-policy  shock explains  10% of the reduction  in the 
variance of GDP growth when  the first period  ends in 1983 (but none of 
the reduction when  the first period ends in 1978). The BM shock explains 
more of the reduction,  at least in some  specifications,  although  that per- 
centage reduction is not directly comparable to the other rows because it 
pertains to industrial production.  Fiscal-policy  shocks make a negligible 
contribution,  and oil price shocks  either make  a negligible  contribution 
(the Hamilton  shock)  or go  the wrong  way,  because  oil price volatility 
increased in the second period. Productivity and commodity  price shocks 
seem  to have  made  modest  contributions,  in the neighborhood  of 15%, 
to the reduction  in the variance of four-quarter GDP growth. 
It is tempting  to add  up  the entries in the final column  to produce  a 
composite  number, but the result would  be misleading.  If these are true 
structural shocks, they should  be uncorrelated with  each other, but they 
are not; there is, in fact, considerable  disagreement  about whether  these 
series are plausible proxies for the structural shocks they purport to esti- 
mate (e.g. Rudebusch,  1998). This said, although  these  shocks appear to 
explain  some of the observed  reduction in the volatility,  most-perhaps 
three-fourths-of  the reduction in volatility is not explained by the reduc- 
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5.5 CHANGES  IN POLICY 
An important candidate  for the moderation  in GDP growth  is improved 
monetary policy.12  Most importantly, the timing is right: empirical studies 
suggest  that  monetary  policy  changed  significantly  in  the  Volcker- 
Greenspan era relative to earlier times. For example, Taylor (1999b), Clar- 
ida, Gali, and Gertler (2000), and Boivin  and Giannoni  (2002b) estimate 
large increases  in the inflation response  in Taylor-type  monetary  policy 
rules for the short-term interest rate. Moreover, developments  in financial 
markets are consistent  with  a shift in monetary  policy.  Although  short 
rates are less variable than they were before 1984, they seem  to be more 
persistent: Watson (1999) reports that the (median unbiased)  estimate of 
the largest  AR root  for monthly  observations  of the  federal  funds  rate 
increased  from 0.96 in the 1965-1978  sample  period  to 1.00 in the 1985- 
1998 sample period.13  This increase in persistence has a large effect on the 
variance  of expected  future values  of the federal funds  rate, and hence 
on the expectations  component  of long-term rates. Indeed, while  the vari- 
ance of short rates declined  in the second  sample period, the variance of 
long  rates, relative to that of short rates, increased.  Taking this together 
with  the  evidence  on  changing  Taylor-rule coefficients,  it appears  that 
the Fed has become  more responsive  to movements  in inflation and out- 
put  and  that these  responses  have  led  to increases  in the variability  of 
(medium-  and long-term)  interest rates. 
There now  are a number of studies  examining  the extent to which  this 
change  in monetary  policy-more  precisely,  this change  in the rule ap- 
proximating  monetary  policy-caused  the reduction  of  the variance  of 
output growth and/or  inflation; see Boivin and Giannoni (2002a, 2002b), 
Clarida, Gali and Gertler (2000), Cogley  and Sargent (2001), Gali, Lopez- 
Salido, and Valles (2002), Primiceri (2002), and Sims and Zha (2002). This 
is a challenging  task: to evaluate  the effect of a change in the monetary- 
policy rule, it is necessary to specify a model of the economy  that is argu- 
ably invariant to the policy  shift, that is, to specify  a plausible  structural 
model  for the economy.  The general strategy in this literature has been 
to combine  some  structural reasoning  with  VARs that permit the model 
to fit the  dynamics  in the  data, but  within  this  general  framework  the 
details of the approach differ widely.  In this subsection, we perform these 
12. As Taylor (2000) argues, fiscal policy  is not a likely candidate.  For example,  Auerbach 
and Feenberg (2000) show  that fiscal automatic stabilizers in 1995 were roughly at their 
same level as in the early 1960s, and if anything  were higher in the late 1970s and early 
1980s (because of high  inflation and the lack of indexation  of the tax code). 
13. Similar results,  obtained  using  different  methods,  are reported  by  Kim, Nelson,  and 
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counterfactual policy  evaluation  calculations using  a four-variable struc- 
tural VAR with GDP growth  (y), GDP deflator inflation (n), the one-year 
Treasury bill rate (R), and commodity  prices (PSCCOM, z). 
5.5.1 Model Specification  and Identification  The structural VAR identifica- 
tion scheme is based on a structural model with an IS equation, a forward- 
looking  New  Keynesian  Phillips  curve,  a forward-looking  Taylor-type 
monetary-policy  rule, and an exogenous  process  for commodity  prices: 
yt =  Ort  +  lags  +  Ey,t,  (4) 
it  =  yY(6)t +  lags  +  ?,,t,  (5) 
rt  =  t  ,Trlt+h/t  +  pyYl/t  +  lags  +  r,t,  (6) 
Zt =  lags  +  oXyy,t +  OCalT,t  +  CrEr,t  +  Ez,t,  (7) 
where rt = Rt -  ft+k/t  is the real interest rate; itt+k/t is the expected  average 
inflation rate over the next k periods,  where  k is the term of the interest 
rate R; Y(6)t =  7r=o8'iy  -/t  is the discounted  expected  future output  gap; 
and yia/t is the expected  future average  output  gap  over the next h pe- 
riods. We have  used  generic notation  "lags" to denote  unrestricted lags 
of variables in each of these equations. 
Equation (4) is an IS relation. Equation (5) is a hybrid New  Keynesian 
Phillips curve. If 8, the discount  factor used  to construct Y(6)t,  is equal to 
0, then this is a traditional formulation  of the relation. More recent for- 
mulations  based  on price stickiness  [discussed,  for example,  in Gali and 
Gertler (1999), Goodfriend  and King (1997), and Rotemberg and Wood- 
ford (1997, 1999)] express Tt  as a function  of the output  gap (as a proxy 
for marginal  cost)  and  expected  future  inflation.  Solving  this  equation 
forward yields  (5) with  8 =  1. Allowing  forward-looking  and backward- 
looking  price setting  yields  (5) with  8 interpreted  as the weight  on for- 
ward inflation (Gali and Gertler, 1999). Equation (6) is a forward-looking 
Taylor rule, written  in terms  of  the real interest  rate. The parameter h 
indexes  the horizon.  For simplicity  we  use  the same  interest rate in (4) 
and (6), although  in principle one would  like to use long rates in (4) and 
short rates in (6).14  We use  the  1-year interest rate as a compromise  be- 
tween a long and short rate. Similarly, in our benchmark specification we 
use a 1-year horizon  in (6), so that h =  4, but investigate  the robustness 
of this as well. The commodity-price  equation (7) plays no structural role 
14. Both long and short rates could be included  by adding  a term structure equation as in 
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in the analysis, but, as is conventional,  commodity  prices are included  to 
help forecast future values  of inflation and the output gap. As usual, the 
E's are taken to be mutually  uncorrelated  structural shocks. 
5.5.2 Estimation  Our estimation  strategy relies on a priori knowledge  of 
the three key parameters 0 (the slope  of the IS function), y (the slope  of 
the Phillips relation), and 6 (the parameter governing the forward-looking 
nature of the Phillips  relation). Given  these parameters, estimation  pro- 
ceeds as follows.  First, projecting all variables on lags produces  a version 
of (4)-(7)  in which  the variables  are replaced by reduced-form  VAR re- 
siduals.  (The forecasts of the output  gap and inflation are computed  by 
the VAR, so that innovations  in these variables are also functions  of the 
reduced-form  VAR innovations.)  We suppose  that the forecast errors as- 
sociated  with  trend output  are negligible,  so we  replace innovations  in 
the expected future gap with innovations  in expected future output. Then, 
with  0, 6 and y given,  the errors cy and E? follow  from (4) and (5). These 
errors are in turn used  as instruments  to estimate  the parameters in the 
Taylor rule, yielding  ?r.  The unknown  coefficients in (7) can then be deter- 
mined by OLS. We assume that the parameters 0, 6, and y remain constant 
over the entire sample  period, but we  allow  the parameter of the Taylor 
rule to change.  We also allow  the coefficients  in equation  (7) to change. 
There is considerable  disagreement  about the values  of the parameters 
0, y, and  6 in  the  literature  [see  Rudebusch  (2002)]. In our benchmark 
model,  we  set  0  =  -0.2,  y =  0.3, and  6  =  0.5. When  simulating  small 
quantitative models,  a larger value for 0 is sometimes  used  (e.g. 0 =  -1), 
but large values of 0 are difficult to reconcile with IS slope estimates com- 
puted  by  traditional  methods  (which  often find values  of 0  =  -  0.1 or 
smaller). The value y = 0.3 was used by Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2000) 
in their simulations  of the effects of changes in monetary policy on output 
and inflation  variability.  Traditional estimates  of the Phillips  curve  (for 
example,  Staiger, Stock, and  Watson,  2001) suggest  values  of y around 
0.1. The value  of 6 has  also been  the subject of controversy.  Backward- 
looking  models  (such as Rudebusch,  and Svensson  1999) set 6 =  0, Gali 
and Gertler (1999) estimate  6 to be approximately  0.6, and many models 
are simulated  with  6 =  1.0. 
Table 9 summarizes  the results for these benchmark parameter values. 
Results are presented  for the 1960-1978  and  1984-2001  sample  periods. 
The estimated  Taylor-rule coefficients (Table 9a) are consistent with what 
others have  found.  The inflation response  in the first period  is negative 
(remember  that we  specify  the Taylor rule using  the real interest rate), 
and the output coefficient is small. In the second period both the inflation 
and output  coefficients  are significantly  higher. Table 9  IMPLIED STANDARD  DEVIATION  FROM SAMPLE-SPECIFIC STRUCTURAL VARs 
AXt  =  Ad)(L)Xt,l  +  ?t,  var(Et)  = 
Estimated  parameters:  li(L),  Al, and  Ql (period  1), and  D2(L),  A2, and  Q2 (period  2) 
(a) Estimated  Taylor-Rule  Coefficients,  Benchmark  Specification 
0  =  -0.2,  6  =  0.5,  y  =  0.3 
Sample period  P  Py 
1  -0.25  (0.18)  0.16 (0.18) 
2  0.75 (0.31)  0.62 (0.18) 
(b) Implied  Standard  Deviations  of Four-Quarter  GDP Growth,  Benchmark  Specification 
Standard deviations implied by VAR 
VAR with do =  4  l  VAR with  D =  4  2 
Sample standard  deviation 
Ql,  Ql,  Q2,  Q2,  Fract.  Ql,  Ql,  Q2,  Q2,  Fract. 
Variable  1960-1978  1984-2001  A1  A2  A1  A2  Varl  A1  A2  A1  A2  Var2 
GDP  2.49  1.60  2.54  2.41  1.59  1.50  0.14  2.68  2.30  1.67  1.41  0.18 
Inflation  1.37  0.59  1.40  1.32  0.96  0.92  0.13  0.85  0.74  0.63  0.56  0.05 




Z (c) Sensitivity  Analysis:  Alternative  Parameter  Values 
Standard deviations implied by VAR 
Estimated Taylor rule coefficients 
IS and Phillips-Curve  ,  Var with (f  =  -  VAR with 4i  -= (2 
coefficients  Period 1  Period 2 
Q ,  QPP2,  Fract.  12  ,  Q2,  Fract. 
0  Y  6  P  Py  P  Pay  A2  A1  Varl  A2  A1  Var2 
-0.20  0.30  0.50  -0.25  0.16  0.75  0.63  2.41  1.59 
-0.20  0.30  0.90  0.00  0.06  4.15  0.25  1.86  2.88 
-0.20  0.30  0.10  -0.40  0.22  0.21  0.69  2.41  1.61 
-0.20  0.10  0.50  -0.45  0.24  0.19  0.69  2.39  1.63 
-0.20  0.60  0.50  0.12  0.01  1.55  0.54  2.38  1.62 
-0.10  0.30  0.50  -0.45  0.17  0.39  0.57  2.45  1.58 
-0.50  0.30  0.50  0.87  0.14  1.91  0.81  2.19  1.77 
-0.20  0.10  0.90  -0.11  0.10  2.14  0.47  1.98  1.94 
-0.20  0.30  0.75  -0.04  0.07  1.97  0.49  2.20  1.76 
-0.20  0.10  0.75  -0.29  0.18  0.72  0.63  2.35  1.63 
-0.50  0.10  0.75  0.19  0.31  1.62  0.84  2.19  1.80 
0.00  0.30  0.50  -0.61  0.17  0.05  0.51  2.49  1.59 
0.14  2.30  1.67 
0.67  1.87  2.56 
0.14  2.32  1.65 
0.17  2.30  1.65 
0.18  2.28  1.67 
0.09  2.39  1.58 
0.36  2.19  1.77 
0.57  1.96  1.83 
0.36  2.10  1.79 
0.21  2.24  1.68 
0.37  2.02  2.01 
0.06  2.49  1.51 
Notes: The identifying  restrictions  for the structural  VAR are summarized  in equations  (4)-(7)  in the text. The two  sample  periods  are 1960-1978  and  1984-2001. 
Fract. Var, is the ratio, [a2(1I,  Qi, A1) -  a2(l,  lQ1,  A2)]/[2(1,  i, Q1,  A,)  - o2(f2,  22,  A2)], and  Fract. Var2 =  [a2(c2,  Q2,  Al)  -  2((D2,  Q2,  A2)]/[(y2((,,  il, Al)  - 






















0.07 198  STOCK  & WATSON 
Armed with these estimated parameters, we can use the structural VAR 
to compute the implied variability of output growth, changes in inflation, 
and interest rates. The calculations  are analogous  to those carried in Sec- 
tion 4, except now the VAR is characterized by three sets of parameters: (4, 
the VAR distributed lag coefficients (just as in Section 4); ?Q,  the covariance 
matrix  of  the  structural  shocks  (?y,  Ec, ?r,  z);  and  A,  the  structural  coeffi- 
cients (0, y, 6, [3,  3y,  ocy,  oc,  ra)  that link the structural and reduced  form 
errors. We present  results  for the triples  a(;i,  Qi, Ak), for i, j, k =  1, 2 
corresponding  to the two  sample  periods. 
The  results  are shown  in Table 9b. Using  (lI,  2i,  A1), the  standard 
deviation  of the  four-quarter  growth  rate  of GDP  is 2.54%. Using  (42,  Q2, 
A2), the corresponding  value is 1.41%. These are close to the estimates  of 
the standard deviation of output growth computed directly from the sam- 
ple moments  of GDP. How  much of this change in the variability of out- 
put  can be attributed to shocks  (Q), and how  much  to policy  (A)? The 
standard  deviation  of output  using  ((1,  Q2, A1) is 1.59; using  (01,  Ql, A2), it 
is 2.41. These results suggest that 14%  of the decrease in variance in output 
growth  is associated  with  changes  in the monetary-policy  coefficients.l5 
Said differently, most of the reduction in variability in output stems from 
smaller shocks, not from changes in the monetary-policy  coefficients. 
The results for other sets of parameter values  are shown  in Table 9c. 
To save space, this table only reports the estimated Taylor-rule coefficients 
for each subsample  and the implied  variability of output  growth  for the 
four  counterfactual  simulations.  Looking  across  these  results,  the  esti- 
mated effect of the change in monetary policy is larger when  the IS curve 
is more elastic (0 is more negative),  when  the output  gap receives  more 
weight  in the Phillips  curve  (y is larger), and when  the New  Keynesian 
Phillips  curve is more forward looking  (5 is larger). 
One notable special case is when  0 =  0, so that monetary policy has no 
effect on output growth within the period; this corresponds to a common 
VAR-identifying  restriction  [see  the  discussion  in  Christiano,  Eichen- 
baum,  and  Evans  (1999)]. This  assumption  implies  that  the  change  in 
monetary policy had little to do with the decline in output growth volatil- 
ity (the estimated contribution to the variance reduction when  0 = 0, y = 
0.3, and 6 = 0.5 is approximately 6%).  For most of the parameter combina- 
tions  examined  in Table 9c, however,  the estimated  contribution  of the 
change in monetary policy to the reduction in the variance of four-quarter 
GDP growth  falls in the range of 10% to 25%. Estimates with  very large 
contributions  are associated  with  implausibly  large coefficients on infla- 
15. The total decrease in the variance of output  estimated  using  the VAR is 2.542 -  1.412. 
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tion in the estimated second-period  Taylor  rule (inflation  responses of 4 
or more). 
5.5.3 Other  Sensitivity Checks  We performed a number of other sensitivity 
checks. These included reducing the horizon in the Taylor rule to one 
quarter;  dropping the commodity price index from the VAR;  replacing 
the commodity  price index with the estimated  first  factor  (principal  com- 
ponent) constructed  from the series listed in Appendix B [as suggested 
by Bemanke and Boivin's (2000)  factor-augmented  VARs];  and carrying 
out the counterfactuals  holding the parameters  a fixed at their period-1 
values. The results  from  these models are similar  to results  from  the speci- 
fications reported  in Table 9 and, to save space, are not reported. 
5.5.4  Summary Even  within the stylized model of equations  (4)-(7), there 
is considerable  uncertainty  about whether the widely perceived shift in 
monetary policy in the 1980s produced the moderation of output vola- 
tility. For the benchmark  parameter  values, and for other values that 
produce estimates of monetary reaction functions consistent with those 
discussed elsewhere in the literature,  our calculations  attribute  perhaps 
10%  to 25%  of the reduction  in the variance  of four-quarter  GDP growth 
to improved monetary  policy. 
6. Conclusions  and Remaining  Questions 
There  is strong evidence of a decline in the volatility of economic  activity, 
both as measured  by broad  aggregates  and as measured  by a wide variety 
of other series that track  specific  facets of economic  activity.  For  real GDP 
growth, the decline is, we think,  best characterized  as a sharp drop in the 
mid-1980s. This sharp decline, or break, in the volatility in real GDP 
growth is mirrored  by declines in the variance  of the four-quarter  growth 
rates of consumption and production of durable goods, in residential 
fixed investment,  and in the production  of structures.  Not all series,  how- 
ever, have exhibited this sharp drop in volatility, and for some series the 
decline in their variance  is better  characterized  as a trend or, possibly, an 
episodic return  to the relative quiescence of the 1960s. 
Our search for the causes of this great moderation  has not been com- 
pletely successful, nor does one find a compelling case in the literature 
for a single cause. On the positive side, we find some role for improved 
monetary policy; our estimates suggest that the Fed's more aggressive 
response to inflation  since the mid-1980s  has contributed  perhaps 10%  to 
25%  of the decline in output volatility. In addition, we find some role for 
identifiable  shocks,  such as less volatile  productivity  shocks  and commod- 200 . STOCK  & WATSON 
ity price shocks, in reducing the variance of output growth. But this leaves 
much-perhaps  half-of  the decline  in volatility  unaccounted  for. The 
shift away  from manufacturing  and towards  services  does  not seem  to 
explain the moderation; nor do improvements  in inventory management 
arising from information technology  seem to us to be a source of the re- 
ductions  in volatility  of  four-quarter GDP growth,  although  improved 
inventory  management  could  help  to  smooth  production  within  the 
month  or quarter. Our reduced-form  evidence  suggests  that this reduc- 
tion in volatility is associated with an increase in the precision of forecasts 
of output growth (and of other macroeconomic variables), but to a consid- 
erable extent  we  have  not  identified  the specific  source  of the reduced 
forecast errors. 
These results provide  some clues for future work. Among  the compo- 
nents of GDP, the clearest concomitant  declines  appear in durable goods 
(both consumption and production), in output of structures, and in residen- 
tial investment.  The declines  in volatility  appear in a variety of measures 
of residential (but not nonresidential)  construction, and further investiga- 
tion of the role of the housing  sector in the moderation is warranted. 
To the extent that improved  policy gets some of the credit, then one can 
expect at least some  of the moderation  to continue  as long  as the policy 
regime is maintained.  But because most of the reduction seems to be due 
to good luck in the form of smaller economic disturbances, we are left with 
the unsettling conclusion that the quiescence of the past fifteen years could 
well be a hiatus before a return to more turbulent economic times. 
Appendix  A. Time-Series  Methods 
This appendix  describes the stochastic volatility  model  used  to compute 
the  smoothed  estimates  in Figures  2-4  and  the variance-break  tests  in 
Tables 3 and 10. 
A.1 STOCHASTIC  VOLATILITY  MODEL 
The smoothed  instantaneous  standard deviations  were estimated using a 
stochastic volatility  model  with  time-varying  autoregressive  coefficients. 
Specifically, let yt follow  the time-varying  AR process 
p 
yt  =  jtyt-j  +  GtEt, 
j=l 
(jt  =  Ojt-i  +  CjTjt, 
In  Io  =  In  (t_  - +  t,t Table  10  BREAK  RESULTS  FOR  UNIVARIATE  AUTOREGRESSIONS  FOR  SELECTED  MACROECONOMIC 
TIME  SERIES 
Conditional variance: 
Variance  Conditional mean  Conditional variance: break  only  trend and break 
67%  67%  67% 
Break  Confidence  Break  Confidence  Break  Confidence  p-Value:  p-Value:  Break 
Series  p-Value  date  interval  p-Value  date  interval  p-Value  date  interval  trend  break  date 
GDPQ  0.00  1984:2  1983:3-1987:1  0.98  0.00  1983:2  1982:4-1985:3  0.65  0.00  1983:2 
GCQ  0.00  1993:1  1992:3-1996:2  0.55  0.00  1992:1  1991:3-1994:1  0.00  0.12 
GCDQ  0.00  1991:1  1990:4-1994:1  0.04  1987:3  1987:1-1988:1  0.00  1987:3  1987:2-1990:2  0.69  0.02  1987:3 
GCNQ  0.38  0.00  1991:4  1991:2-1992:2  0.08  0.96  0.79 
GCSQ  0.03  1993:2  1992:2-1998:4  0.00  1969:4  1969:2-1970:2  0.18  0.03  0.00  1971.3 
GPIQ  0.07  0.05  0.13  0.06  0.26 
GIFQ  0.02  1984:2  1982:4-1989:3  0.69  0.01  1983:3  1983:1-1986:4  0.66  0.07 
GINQ  0.84  0.47  0.70  0.69  0.61 
GIRQ  0.01  1983:3  1982:4-1989:1  0.10  0.00  1983:2  1983:1-1985:2  0.08  0.00  1983:2 
DGV_GDP  0.26  0.91  0.04  1988:1  1987:3-1992:2  0.00  0.10 
GEXQ  0.03  1973:1  1972:4-1978:1  0.09  0.00  1975:4  1975:2-1978:2  0.95  0.75 
GIMQ  0.00  1985:3  1985:1-1990:2  0.00  1972:4  1972:2-1973:2  0.00  1986:2  1986:1-1988:1  0.96  0.05  1986.2 
GGEQ  0.65  0.06  0.45  0.33  0.66 
GOQ  0.01  1984:2  1983:2-1989:3  0.92  0.00  1983:4  1983:2-1986:4  0.54  0.02  1983:4 
GODQ  0.04  1984:1  1983:4-1992:2  0.09  0.00  1983:4  1983:3-1987:1  0.00  0.30 
GONQX  0.12  0.77  0.02  1985:2  1984:3-1989:1  0.34  0.02  1985:2 
GOOSQ  0.00  1967:1  1965:3-1968:1  0.00  1968:3  1968:1-1969:1  0.98  0.69  0.93 
GOCQ  0.01  1984:2  1983:1-1988:3  0.02  1991:3  1991:1-1992:1  0.02  1984:2  1983:4-1988:1  0.43  0.03  1984.2 
LPNAG  0.03  1984:4  1981:1-1987:3  0.03  1981:2  1980:4-1981:4  0.00  1983:2  1982:4-1985:3  0.00  0.01  1973:3 
GDPD  0.37  0.00  1973:2  1972:4-1973:4  0.11  0.00  0.00  1971:2 
FYGM3  0.71  0.00  1981:1  1980:3-1981:3  0.01  1984:4  1984:2-1988:1  0.00  0.00  1984:4 
FYGT10  0.01  1979:3  1975:4-1981:1  0.02  1981:1  1980:3-1981:3  0.00  1979:3  1972:2-1980:1  0.02  0.00  1979:3 
GGFENQ  0.49  0.00  1972:2  1971:4-1972:4  0.00  1987:4  1984:2-1989:4  0.00  0.04  1974:3 
GOSQ  0.03  1993:4  1993:2-2000:1  0.50  0.39  0.10  0.21 





C) Table  10  CONTINUED 
Conditional variance: 
Variance  Conditional mean  Conditional variance: break  only  trend and break 
67%  67%  67% 
Break  Confidence  Break  Confidence  Break  Confidence  p-Value:  p-Value:  Break 
Series  p-Value  date  interval  p-Value  date  interval  p-Value  date  interval  trend  break  date 
GONSQX  0.00  1986:2  1984:1-1988:2  0.46  0.01  1986:2  1985:3-1989:3  0.02  0.64 
CONCRED  0.01  1995:1  1994:4-2001:3  0.29  0.19  0.30  0.05  1970:1 
FM1  0.02  1979:1  1971:3-1979:2  0.03  1980:4  1980:2-1981:2  0.00  1979:3  1971:2-1980:3  0.00  0.67 
FM2  0.01  1993:2  1992:4-1998:2  0.16  0.27  0.14  0.13 
FM2DQ  0.05  0.00  1975:2  1974:4-1975:4  0.16  0.04  0.00  1989:3 
FM3  1.00  0.20  0.11  0.38  0.05  1971:2 
FMFBA  0.88  0.03  1981:2  1980:4-1981:4  0.07  0.06  0.88 
FMRRA  0.04  1978:3  1974:4-1982:1  0.02  1972:3  1972:1-1973:1  0.00  1978:3  1974:1-1979:4  0.99  0.37 
FSDXP  0.63  0.01  1979:1  1978:3-1979:3  0.21  0.35  0.07 
FSNCOM  0.32  0.02  1975:3  1975:1-1976:1  0.42  0.25  0.13 
FSPCAP  0.57  0.10  0.60  0.18  0.15 
FSPCOM  0.73  0.00  1978:4  1978:2-1979:2  0.45  0.66  0.35 
FSPIN  0.91  0.00  1995:1  1994:3-1995:3  0.10  0.34  0.04  1991:1 
FSPXE  0.41  0.02  1978:4  1978:2-1979:2  0.77  0.61  0.56 
FYAAAC  0.02  1979:3  1974:1-1980:2  0.01  1981:3  1981:1-1982:1  0.00  1979:2  1972:1-1979:4  0.00  0.00  1979:2 
FYBAAC  0.02  1979:3  1974:1-1980:2  0.02  1980:4  1980:2-1981:2  0.00  1979:3  1973:1-1980:2  0.00  0.00  1989:1 
FYFF  0.53  0.07  0.00  1984:4  1984:3-1987:3  0.00  0.00  1984:4 
FYFHA  0.04  1979:3  1973:4-1980:4  0.11  0.00  1979:3  1974:3-1980:1  0.06  0.00  1979:3 
FYGT1  0.01  1966:4  1965:4-1967:1  0.00  1981:1  1980:3-1981:3  0.05  1984:4  1984:2-1989:3  0.00  0.00  1984:4 
GMCANQ  0.00  1991:1  1990:4-1994:4  0.08  0.03  1991:3  1991:2-1994:4  0.00  0.06 
GMCDQ  0.00  1991:1  1990:4-1994:1  0.04  1987:3  1987:1-1988:1  0.00  1987:3  1987:2-1990:1  0.72  0.03  1987:3 
GMCNQ  0.38  0.00  1991:4  1991:2-1992:2  0.09  0.96  0.78 
GMCQ  0.00  1993:1  1992:3-1996:2  0.61  0.00  1992:1  1991:3-1994:1  0.00  0.12 
GMCSQ  0.03  1993:2  1992:2-1998:4  0.00  1969:4  1969:2-1970:2  0.18  0.03  0.00  1971:3 





z 0.12  0.33 
0.13  0.01 
0.08  0.00 
0.18  0.71 
0.00  1992:2  1992:1-1997:2  0.08 
0.13 
1992:3  1992:1-1993:1  0.04  1984:3  1983:4-1988:4 
1991:1  1990:3-1991:3  0.00  1984:3  1983:4-1987:2 
0.00  1984:1  1983:3-1986:4 
0.02  1986:1  1985:2-1989:4 
HSSOU  0.15  0.02  1995:2  1994:4-1995:4  0.16  0.05  0.00  1983:1 
HSWST  0.01  1985:1  1983:2-1989:3  0.00  1991:1  1990:3-1991:3  0.00  1985:1  1984:3-1987:1  0.00  0.00  1966:2 
IP  0.00  1984:1  1983:3-1988:4  0.01  1992:1  1991:3-1992:3  0.00  1983:3  1983:2-1985:3  0.00  0.00  1973:4 
IPC  0.01  1983:3  1983:2-1989:3  0.36  0.00  1984:1  1983:3-1986:3  0.00  0.13 
IPCD  0.06  0.76  0.02  1983:3  1983:1-1987:3  0.02  0.30 
IPCN  0.23  0.00  1978:2  1977:4-1978:4  0.20  0.01  0.07 
IPD  0.04  1984:1  1983:3-1992:1  0.04  1993:3  1993:1-1994:1  0.00  1984:1  1983:3-1987:1  0.65  0.04  1983:3 
IPE  0.05  0.74  0.16  0.07  0.24 
IPF  0.00  1984:2  1983:3-1988:3  0.56  0.00  1983:3  1983:1-1985:4  0.79  0.03  1983:3 
IPI  0.58  0.92  0.00  1983:3  1982:3-1986:3  0.00  0.00  1973:3 
IPM  0.00  1984:1  1983:4-1989:1  0.00  1993:3  1993:1-1994:1  0.00  1983:3  1983:1-1985:3  0.74  0.01  1983:3 
IPMD  0.01  1984:1  1983:3-1989:4  0.10  0.00  1983:1  1982:4-1985:1  0.96  0.07 
IPMFG  0.01  1984:1  1983:3-1989:3  0.02  1992:1  1991:3-1992:3  0.00  1984:1  1983:4-1986:1  0.00  0.01  1973:4 
IPMIN  0.01  1986:3  1986:2-1993:3  0.01  1982:2  1981:4-1982:4  0.10  0.03  0.08 
IPMND  0.60  0.01  1974:1  1973:3-1974:3  0.27  0.04  0.00  1974:3 
IPN  0.28  0.00  1978:2  1977:4-1978:4  0.00  1983:3  1983:1-1986:4  0.00  0.00  1974:3 
IPP  0.02  1984:1  1982:3-1989:1  0.01  1994:3  1994:1-1995:1  0.00  1983:3  1983:1-1985:4  0.00  0.00  1973:4 
IPUT  0.00  1980:4  1977:2-1982:1  0.00  1972:4  1972:2-1973:2  0.00  1978:4  1973:4-1980:1  0.00  0.04  1990:2 
IPXMCA  0.00  1983:4  1983:3-1988:3  0.31  0.00  1983:1  1982:3-1985:2  0.00  0.08 
IVMFDQ  0.00  1993:1  1992:3-1997:1  0.02  1967:2  1966:4-1967:4  0.00  1967:2  1966:4-1969:1  0.00  0.06 
IVMFGQ  0.10  0.02  1975:1  1974:3-1975:3  0.43  0.15  0.20 
IVMFNQ  0.01  1985:3  1985:1-1992:1  0.03  1984:3  1984:1-1985:1  0.25  0.23  0.05  1985:3 
IVMTQ  0.33  0.24  0.74  0.35  0.49 
IVRRQ  0.01  1987:2  1986:3-1992:3  0.27  0.14  0.18  0.73 
















0.00  1970:3 
0.00  1984:3 
0.00  1984:3 
0.00  1984:1 
0.20 Table 10  CONTINUED 
Conditional  variance: 
Variance  Conditional  mean  Conditional  variance:  break  only  trend  and  break 
67%  67%  67% 
Break  Confidence  Break  Confidence  Break  Confidence  p-Value:  p-Value:  Break 
Series  p-Value  date  interval  p-Value  date  interval  p-Value  date  interval  trend  break  date 
IVSRMQ  0.05  1984:3 1984:2-1993:4  0.57  0.00  1983:4 1983:2-1986:3  0.08  0.00  1983:4 
IVSRQ  0.06  0.68  0.00  1983:4 1983:2-1986:3  0.00  0.00  1972:3 
IVSRRQ  0.89  0.23  0.42  0.21  0.09 
IVSRWQ  0.01  1984:4 1984:2-1990:4  0.69  0.00  1984:2 1983:2-1986:3  0.92  0.12 
GVSQ  0.28  0.09  0.53  0.16  0.29 
GVDSQ  0.00  1992:4 1992:3-1998:2  0.47  0.08  0.02  0.26 
GVNSQ  0.37  0.00  1974:3 1974:1-1975:1  0.08  0.02  0.00  1985:4 
MDOQ  0.03  1984:2 1983:4-1991:2  0.95  0.02  1984:2 1983:4-1988:2  0.18  0.00  1984:2 
MOCMQ  0.01  1984:2 1983:3-1990:1  0.44  0.00  1983:3 1983:1-1986:2  0.12  0.00  1983:3 
MPCONQ  0.07  0.04  1973:3 1973:1-1974:1  0.20  0.04  0.00  1966:3 
MSDQ  0.05  1983:4 1983:3-1992:3  0.81  0.01  1983:4 1983:2-1987:2  0.17  0.00  1983:4 
MSMQ  0.00  1983:4 1983:2-1987:1  0.75  0.00  1983:4 1983:2-1985:4  0.16  0.00  1983:4 
MSMTQ  0.01  1984:1 1983:3-1990:2  0.30  0.00  1983:4 1983:2-1986:2  0.59  0.01  1983:4 
MSNQ  0.02  1983:2 1983:1-1990:4  0.24  0.00  1983:2 1982:4-1985:4  0.09  0.00  1983:2 
MSONDQ  1.00  0.33  0.55  0.63  0.41 
LHEL  0.45  0.00  1995:2 1994:4-1995:4  0.00  1983:2 1982:4-1986:2  0.02  0.00  1983:2 
LHELX  0.03  1984:2 1982:3-1989:2  0.08  0.00  1983:4 1983:1-1986:4  0.25  0.00  1983:4 
LHEM  0.28  0.43  0.00  1984:4 1983:4-1987:4  0.00  0.00  1974:3 
LHNAG  0.24  0.23  0.00  1984:4 1983:4-1987:3  0.00  0.00  1972:4 
LHU14  0.00  1984:2 1983:4-1989:3  0.97  0.00  1982:2 1981:4-1985:1  0.00  0.46 
LHU15  0.02  1984:3 1983:4-1990:2  0.00  1982:2 1981:4-1982:4  0.00  1977:2 1976:3-1980:2  0.92  0.27 
LHU26  0.07  0.00  1983:3 1983:1-1984:1  0.00  1983:2 1982:1-1986:2  0.19  0.00  1982:1 
LHU5  0.07  0.11  0.06  0.02  0.28 
LHU680  0.03  1985:1 1983:2-1990:1  0.00  1994:2 1993:4-1994:4  0.16  0.99  0.72 
LHUR  0.25  0.50  0.01  1983:4 1983:2-1987:2  0.00  0.00  1972:4 
(rq 
z  ? LP  0.01  1984:4  1982:4-1988:2  0.01  1981:3  1981:1-1982:1  0.00  1982:1  1981:4-1984:1  0.00  0.01  1970:1 
LPCC  0.38  0.01  1966:3  1966:1-1967:1  0.00  1984:1  1983:3-1986:3  0.00  0.00  1974:1 
LPED  0.00  1984:3  1983:1-1987:4  0.34  0.00  1983:3  1983:2-1985:4  0.00  0.06 
LPEM  0.00  1984:2  1983:3-1987:2  0.08  0.00  1983:1  1982:4-1984:4  0.00  0.00  1969:3 
LPEN  0.07  0.02  1995:1  1994:3-1995:3  0.00  1984:2  1983:4-1986:2  0.65  0.00  1984:2 
LPFR  0.00  1966:4  1965:3-1967:1  0.00  1987:2  1986:4-1987:4  0.38  0.17  0.07 
LPGD  0.00  1984:2  1983:2-1987:4  0.24  0.00  1982:1  1981:4-1984:1  0.00  0.00  1970:1 
LPGOV  1.00  0.49  0.79  0.43  0.37 
LPHRM  0.02  1983:4  1983:3-1990:4  0.04  1995:1  1994:3-1995:3  0.00  1983:3  1982:4-1986:4  0.00  0.02  1973:4 
LPMOSA  0.00  1984:1  1983:4-1988:3  0.61  0.00  1983:3  1983:1-1985:3  0.76  0.01  1983:3 
LPS  1.00  0.27  0.05  1978:2  1976:4-1982:4  0.00  0.00  1970:1 
LPSP  1.00  0.41  0.17  0.03  0.26 
LPT  0.04  1992:4  1991:3-1998:2  0.28  0.00  1991:1  1990:3-1993:2  0.00  0.00  1974:4 
PMCP  0.04  1972:3  1967:3-1974:3  0.01  1980:4  1980:2-1981:2  0.16  0.45  0.12 
PMDEL  0.38  0.00  1994:4  1994:2-1995:2  0.00  1981:4  1981:3-1983:2  0.96  0.22 
PMEMP  0.17  0.01  1981:1  1980:3-1981:3  0.01  1983:1  1982:3-1986:3  0.02  0.73 
PMI  0.10  0.00  1994:4  1994:2-1995:2  0.00  1984:4  1984:2-1987:4  0.72  0.06 
PMNO  0.17  0.00  1994:4  1994:2-1995:2  0.19  0.02  0.06 
PMNV  0.02  1984:2  1983:3-1990:3  0.00  1979:3  1979:1-1980:1  0.00  1977:1  1976:3-1978:2  0.72  0.25 
PMP  0.18  0.00  1994:4  1994:2-1995:2  0.07  0.00  0.00  1970:3 
R-LEHCC  0.00  1992:1  1991:2-1993:3  0.00  1973:1  1972:3-1973:3  0.41  0.19  0.10 
LEHCC  0.03  1991:2  1989:4-1996:2  0.05  1969:2  1968:4-1969:4  0.08  0.00  0.00  1972:1 
R-LEHM  0.03  1980:1  1978:2-1985:2  0.00  1972:1  1971:3-1972:3  0.00  1983:1  1981:3-1986:1  0.57  0.04  1983:1 
LEHM  0.02  1975:1  1974:4-1980:2  0.01  1974:2  1973:4-1974:4  0.02  1975:1  1974:3-1978:4  0.98  0.62 
GDC  0.05  0.02  1973:2  1972:4-1973:4  0.03  1970:3  1965:4-1972:4  0.06  0.00  1970:3 
PUNEW  0.12  0.00  1966:1  1965:3-1966:3  0.01  1970:2  1960:1-1970:4  0.00  0.00  1991:2 
PUXF  0.10  0.00  1975:2  1974:4-1975:4  0.02  1991:2  1990:4-1994:3  0.03  0.00  1991:2 
PUXHS  0.23  0.08  0.01  1972:4  1960:1-1973:2  0.00  0.00  1991:3 
PUXM  0.09  0.00  1980:1  1979:3-1980:3  0.03  1991:2  1990:4-1994:4  0.08  0.00  1991:2 
PW  0.27  0.01  1974:4  1974:2-1975:2  0.00  1972:4  1965:1-1973:4  0.24  0.00  1972:4 
PSCCOM  0.05  1972:4  1962:2-1973:1  0.21  0.04  1971:4  1962:1-1973:2  0.04  0.00  1971:4 
R-PSCCOM  0.03  1971:4  1962:4-1972:1  0.13  0.02  1971:4  1963:4-1973:2  0.00  0.00  1971:4 
PSM99Q  0.04  1973:4  1964:2-1974:1  0.01  1974:4  1974:2-1975:2  0.11  0.10  0.00  1973:4 
R_PSM99Q  0.05  1971:4  1961:1-1972:1  0.01  1974:1  1973:3-1974:3  0.23  0.04  0.00  1973:4 





m Table 10  CONTINUED 
Conditional variance: 
Variance  Conditional mean  Conditional variance: break  only  trend and break 
67%  67%  67% 
Break  Confidence  Break  Confidence  Break  Confidence  p-Value:  p-Value:  Break 
Series  p-Value  date  interval  p-Value  date  interval  p-Value  date  interval  trend  break  date 
R_PU83  0.07  0.00  1968:3 1968:1-1969:1  0.00  1973:2 1969:2-1974:1  0.00  0.00  1990:1 
PU84  0.05  1979:1 1970:1-1979:2  0.47  0.00  1978:2 1968:4-1979:2  0.00  0.00  1991:4 
R_PU84  0.00  1970:3 1965:1-1970:4  0.03  1969:2 1968:4-1969:4  0.02  1973:2 1962:3-1974:2  0.00  0.13 
PU85  0.05  0.55  0.00  1984:2 1984:1-1986:4  0.00  0.00  1966:2 
RJPU85  0.00  1992:4 1992:3-1997:3  0.12  0.00  1983:2 1982:4-1985:4  0.00  0.00  1971:3 
PUC  0.04  1972:4 1962:3-1973:1  0.00  1972:3 1972:1-1973:1  0.02  1972:4 1962:4-1974:1  0.00  0.00  1992:1 
R_PUC  0.00  1972:4 1966:2-1973:1  0.00  1970:3 1970:1-1971:1  0.02  1972:4 1961:1-1973:4  0.02  0.07 
PUCD  0.11  0.00  1978:2 1977:4-1978:4  0.00  1991:1 1990:3-1993:3  0.00  0.00  1969:2 
R-PUCD  0.14  0.07  0.10  0.19  0.02  1985:3 
PUS  0.15  0.52  0.00  1983:4 1983:3-1987:1  0.00  0.00  1983:4 
R-PUS  0.01  1986:2 1986:1-1987:1  0.01  1980:2 1979:4-1980:4  0.00  1986:2 1986:1-1988:2  0.00  0.00  1983:3 
PW561  0.00  1985:4 1984:4-1986:3  0.03  1974:1 1973:3-1974:3  0.00  1985:4 1980:4-1986:1  0.72  0.07 
R_PW561  0.00  1985:4 1984:2-1986:3  0.00  1974:1 1973:3-1974:3  0.00  1985:4 1981:2-1986:1  0.73  0.06 
PWFCSA  0.53  0.76  0.02  1972:4 1964:4-1974:2  0.17  0.00  1972:4 
R_PWFCSA  0.10  0.41  0.02  1972:4 1964:1-1974:2  0.22  0.00  1972:4 
PWFSA  0.41  0.88  0.02  1972:4 1965:2-1974:3  0.08  0.00  1972:4 
R_PWFSA  0.11  0.64  0.02  1972:2 1967:1-1974:2  0.26  0.00  1972:2 
RTNQ  0.73  0.00  1973:4 1973:2-1974:2  0.12  0.10  0.71 
WTDQ  0.03  1984:2 1984:1-1992:2  0.81  0.00  1982:2 1981:2-1985:2  0.22  0.00  1982:2 
WTNQ  0.19  0.31  0.04  1986:3 1985:3-1990:3  0.01  0.07 
WTQ  0.01  1984:2 1984:1-1991:3  0.08  0.00  1982:3 1982:1-1985:1  0.00  0.02  1972:3 
IPCAN  0.00  1991:1 1990:4-1996:1  0.04  1974:1 1973:3-1974:3  0.07  0.83  0.19 
IPFR  0.04  1980:4 1980:3-1988:2  0.03  1974:2 1973:4-1974:4  0.15  0.61  0.21 
IPIT  0.01  1983:3 1983:2-1990:3  0.00  1973:2 1972:4-1973:4  0.01  1983:3 1983:1-1987:1  0.00  0.00  1969:2 
IPJP  0.24  0.00  1973:1  1972:3-1973:3  0.15  0.01  0.00  1976:2 
IPOECD  0.05  1984:3 1983:3-1991:1  0.01  1972:2 1971:4-1972:4  0.00  1984:3 1984:1-1987:2  0.00  0.15 
IPUK  0.10  0.00  1974:3 1974:1-1975:1  0.02  1985:3 1985:2-1989:2  0.00  0.00  1971:4 
IPWG  0.32  0.27  0.30  0.98  0.96 
Notes:  The  first  column  reports  tests of the hypothesis  that  the variance  of the series  is constant,  against  the alternative  of a single break.  For  the remaining  columns, 
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where Et, llt,...,  Tlpt  are i.i.d. N(0, 1) and independently  distributed, and 
where  it  is distributed  independently  of the other shocks.  To allow  for 
large jumps  in  the  instantaneous  innovation  variance  t 
2  (and  thereby 
capture  a possible  break in the variance),  we  use  a mixture-of-normals 
model  for  ,t; specifically,  t  i  distributed N(0,  r2)  with probability q and 
N(0,  r2)  with  probability  1 -  q. The series yt is standardized  before  the 
computations,  and  we  set  Cj =  7/T,  a value  consistent  with  previous 
estimates of parameter drift in autoregressions.  For these calculations, we 
set t1 =  0.04, T2 =  0.2, q =  0.95, and p =  4. 
The non-Gaussian  smoother  for the time-varying  parameters  is com- 
puted  using  Markov-chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) methods.  Let Y denote 
yi,  ?  ,  T, let A denote  {jt, j =  1,...,  p, t =  1,...,  T), and let S denote 
G1,.  ..,  oTr.  The  MCMC  algorithm  iterates  between  the  three  conditional 
distributions  of YIA, S, of AlY,  S, and of S A, Y. The first two  of these 
conditional  distributions  are normal, given  the stated  assumptions.  The 
third distribution,  however,  is non-normal  and-as  suggested  by Shep- 
hard  (1994)-is  computed  by  approximating  the  distribution  of  In e? 
(which is the distribution of the logarithm of a chi-squared random vari- 
able with  one  degree  of freedom)  by a mixture-of-normals  distribution; 
the means  and variances of the mixture (and the mixture weights)  were 
chosen  to match the first four moments  of the log  X2 distribution.  Initial 
conditions  were  set using  a flat prior, and a diffuse  conjugate prior was 
used  for the parameter values. 
Given the smoothed  parameter values, the estimated instantaneous  au- 
tocovariances of yt are computed using O2T  and ajtlT,  the conditional means 
of ct  and aoj given  yl, . . .,  Y.  The smoothed  instantaneous  variances of 
four-quarter growth rates were computed  by temporal aggregation of the 
instantaneous  autocovariance  function. 
A.2 VARIANCE-BREAK  TESTS 
To test for a break in the unconditional  variance (the first column of Table 
10), the absolute value of the demeaned  series (e.g., the absolute value of 
demeaned  four-quarter growth in GDP) was regressed against a constant 
and a binary variable 1 (t  - z) for the break date. The QLR statistic is the 
squared  heteroscedasticity-  and autocorrelation-robust  t-statistic on  the 
break indicator, maximized  over T in the central 70% of the sample. 
The tests for a break in the conditional  variance were computed  as fol- 
lows.  Let et(K) denote  the errors in the autoregression  in (1), where  the 
AR coefficients  break at date  K, and  let  ?t(K) denote  the OLS residuals 
estimated  with  a break in the AR coefficients  at date  K. Under  the null 
hypothesis  that there is no break in the variance, E I  ?t(K)  I  is constant; under 
the alternative hypothesis  that there is a break at date ', we have El  Et(K) I = 208 ?  STOCK  & WATSON 
(o  +  X l(t  -  z), where  o1 is the first-period standard deviation  and X is 
the difference between  the standard deviations before and after the break. 
We therefore test for a break by computing the QLR statistic in the regres- 
sion  of I?(K) I against  a constant  and the binary variable l(t  -  t),  using 
homoscedastic  standard errors (which are valid under the null), where  K 
is the least-squares estimator of the break date in the AR coefficients. Ta- 
ble 3 also reports results for a trend-augmented  version of this regression, 
in which  I?t(K)I  was  regressed  against  a constant,  l(t  'r), and the time 
trend t, as well  as the p-value for the test that the coefficient on t is zero 
in the regression in which  T =  T.  Critical values  for the QLR statistic [the 
squared t-statistic on l(t  - z), maximized  over z] in this trend-augmented 
regression  were  computed  by  Monte  Carlo simulation.  In all cases,  the 
search over T was  conducted  in the central 70% of the sample. 
Confidence intervals for the conditional-variance  break date were com- 
puted  using  the  least-squares  estimator  from  the  regression  of  I?f(iK) 
against  a constant  and l(t  >-  ).  If there is a break, the variance  of the 
error term in this regression  differs before and after the break, requiring 
a modification  to Bai's (1997) limiting  distribution  for the least-squares 
break-date  estimator.  This modification  entails  scaling  the  distribution 
differently on either side of the break, by the appropriate estimated vari- 
ance. The confidence  interval for the break date is then obtained  by in- 
verting the test of the break date, based  on this distribution. This results 
in asymmetric confidence intervals that express greater uncertainty about 
the break date in the low-  than in the high-volatility  period.  The same 
method  applies  to the unconditional-variance  break date, except the de- 
pendent  variable is the absolute value  of the demeaned  series and HAC 
standard errors are used  as discussed  in Bai (1997). 
Results for all 168 series are summarized  in Table 10. 
Appendix B. Data 
Table 11 lists  the  time  series  used  in the empirical  analysis.  The series 
were  either taken directly  from the DRI-McGraw  Hill  Basic Economics 
database,  in which  case the original  mnemonics  are used,  or produced 
by authors' calculations based on data from that database, in which  case 
the authors' calculations and original DRI-McGraw  Hill series mnemon- 
ics  are summarized  in  the  data  description  field.  Following  the  series 
name is a transformation code and a short data description. The transfor- 
mations are (1) level of the series; (2) first difference; (3) second difference; 
(4) logarithm  of the series; (5) first difference  of the logarithm; (6) sec- 
ond  difference  of the logarithm.  The following  abbreviations  appear in 
the  data  descriptions:  sa  =  seasonally  adjusted;  nsa  =  not  seasonally Has the Business Cycle Changed  and Why? ? 209 
Table 11  DATA 
Series  Transformation 































5  Gross domestic  product  (chained) 
5  Gross domestic  product-goods 
5  Final sales of goods 
5  Gross domestic  product-durable  goods 
5  Final sales of durables 
5  Gross domestic  product-nondurables 
5  Final sales of nondurables 
5  Gross domestic  product-services 
5  Gross domestic  product-structures 
5  Personal consumption  expenditures 
(chained)-total 
5  Personal consumption  expenditures 
(chained)-durables 
5  Personal consumption  expenditures 
(chained)-nondurables 
5  Personal consumption  expenditures 
(chained)-services 
5  Investment,  total (chained) 
5  Fixed investment,  total (chained) 
5  Fixed investment,  nonresidential  (chained) 
5  Fixed investment,  residential  (chained) 
5  Exports of goods  and services  (chained) 
5  Imports of goods  and services  (chained) 
5  Government  consumption  expenditures  and 
gross investment  (chained) 
1  Change  in Nominal  Inventory  Investment 
divided  by nominal  GDP (ac) 
5  National  defense  consumption  expenditures 
and gross investment  (chained) 
5  Personal consumption  expenditures 
(chained)-new  cars (bil. 1996$, saar) 
5  Personal consumption  expenditures 
(chained)-total  durables  (bil. 1996$, saar) 
5  Personal consumption  expenditures 
(chained)-nondurables  (bil. 1992$, saar) 
5  Personal consumption  expenditures 
(chained)-total  (bil. 1992$, saar) 
5  Personal consumption  expenditures 
(chained)-services  (bil. 1992$, saar) 
5  Personal income  (chained)  (series #52) (bil. 
1992$, saar) 
5  Personal income  less transfer payments 
(chained)  (#51) (bil. 1992$, saar) 210  STOCK & WATSON 
Table 11  CONTINUED 
Series  Transformation 
name  code  Description 
Money,  Credit, Interest Rates, and Stock Prices 
6  Consumer  credit 
6  Money  stock: M1 (curr. trav. cks, dem. dep., 
other ckable dep.)  (bil. $, sa) 
6  Money  stock: M2 (M1 +  overnight  rps, euro $, 
g/p  and b/d  mmmfs  and sav and sm time 
dep  (bil. $) 
5  Money  supply-M2  in 1992 dollars (bci) 
6  Money  stock: M3 (bil. $, sa) 
6  Monetary base, adj for reserve requirement 
changes  (mil. $, sa) 
6  Depository  inst reserves: total, adj for reserve 
req chgs  (mil. $, sa) 
5  S&p's composite  common  stock: dividend  yield 
(%  / yr) 
5  Nyse  common  stock price index: composite 
(12/31/65  =  50) 
5  S&p's common  stock price index: capital goods 
(1941-1943  =  10) 
5  S&p's common  stock price index: composite 
(1941-1943  =  10) 
5  S&p's common  stock price index: industrials 
(1941-1943  =  10) 
5  S&p's composite  common  stock: price-earnings 
ratio (%, nsa) 
2  Bond yield: Moody's  aaa corporate (%/yr) 
2  Bond yield: Moody's  baa corporate (%/yr) 
2  Interest rate: federal funds  (effective)  (%/yr, 
nsa) 
2  Secondary market yields  on FHA mortgages 
(%  / yr) 
2  Interest rate; U.S. Treasury bills, sec mkt, 3-mo. 
(%  / yr, nsa) 
2  Interest rate: U.S. Treasury const. maturities, 
1-yr. (%/yr,  nsa) 
2  Interest rate: U.S. Treasury const. maturities, 
10-yr. (%/yr,  nsa) 
5  Housing  authorized: total new  priv. housing 
units  (thous., saar) 
5  Housing  starts: nonfarm (1947-1958;  total farm 
and nonfarm  (1959-)  (thous., sa) 
5  Housing  starts: midwest  (thous. u., sa) 
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Table 11  CONTINUED 
Series  Transformation 
name  code 
HSSOU  5 
HSWST  5 
Industrial Production 
IP  5 
IPC  5 
IPCD  5 
IPCN  5 
IPD  5 
IPE  5 
IPF  5 
IPI  5 
IPM  5 
IPMD  5 
IPMFG  5 
IPMIN  5 
IPMND  5 
IPN  5 
IPP  5 
IPUT  5 
IPXMCA  1 
Inventories,  Orders, and Sales 
IVMFDQ  5 
IVMFGQ  5 
IVMFNQ  5 
IVMTQ  5 
Description 
Housing  starts: south  (thous. u., sa) 
Housing  starts: west  (thous. u., sa) 
Industrial production:  total index  (1992 =  100, 
sa) 
Industrial production:  consumer  goods  (1992 = 
100, sa) 
Industrial production:  durable consumer  goods 
(1992 =  100, sa) 
Industrial production: nondurable  consumer 
goods  (1992 =  100, sa) 
Industrial production:  durable manufacturing 
(1992 =  100, sa) 
Industrial production: business  equipment 
(1992 =  100, sa) 
Industrial production:  final products  (1992 = 
100, sa) 
Industrial production:  Intermediate products 
(1992 =  100, sa) 
Industrial production: materials (1992 = 100, sa) 
Industrial production:  durable-goods  materials 
(1992 =  100, sa) 
Industrial production:  manufacturing  (1992 = 
100, sa) 
Industrial production:  mining  (1992 =  100, sa) 
Industrial production: nondurable-goods  mate- 
rials (1992 =  100, sa) 
Industrial production:  nondurable  manufactur- 
ing (1992 =  100, sa) 
Industrial production: products,  total (1992 = 
100, sa) 
Industrial production:  utilities  (1992 =  100, sa) 
Capacity util. rate: manufacturing,  total (% of 
capacity, sa) (frb) 
Inventories, business  durables  (mil. of chained 
1996 dollars, sa) 
Inventories,  business,  mfg.  (mil. of chained 
1996 dollars, sa) 
Inventories, business,  nondurables  (mil. of 
chained  1996 dollars, sa) 
Mfg. and trade inventories:  total (mil. of 
chained  1996) (sa) 212 * STOCK & WATSON 
Description 
5  Mfg. and trade inventories: retail trade (mil. of 
chained  1996 dollars) (sa) 
5  Mfg. and trade inventories: merchant wholesal- 
ers (mil. of chained  1996 dollars) (sa) 
5  Ratio for mfg. and trade: mfg.; inventory/sales 
(1996$) (s.a.) 
5  Ratio for mfg. and trade: inventory/sales 
(chained  1996 dollars, sa) 
5  Ratio for mfg. and trade: retail trade; 
inventory/sales  (1996$) (s.a.) 
5  Ratio for mfg. and trade: wholesaler; 
inventory/sales  (1996$) (s.a.) 
1  (Change in inventories)/sales-goods  (ac) 
1  (Change in inventories)/sales-durable  goods 
(ac) 
1  (Change in inventories)/  sales-nondurable 
goods 
5  New  orders, durable goods  industries,  1992 
dollars 
5  New  orders (net)-consumer  goods  and materi- 
als, 1992 dollars 
5  Contracts and orders for plant and equipment 
in 1992 dollars 
5  Mfg. and trade: mfg.; durable goods  (mil. of 
chained  1996 dollars) (sa) 
5  Sales, business-mfg.  (chained) 
5  Mfg. and trade: total (mil. of chained  1996 dol- 
lars) (sa) 
5  Mfg. and trade: mfg.; nondurable  goods  (mil. 
of chained  1996 dollars) (sa) 
5  New  orders, nondefense  capital goods,  in 1992 
dollars 
5  Retail trade: nondurable  goods  (mil. of 1996 
dollars) (sa) 
5  Merch wholesalers:  durable goods  total (mil. of 
chained  1996 dollars) (sa) 
5  Merch wholesalers:  nondurable  goods  (mil. of 
chained  1996 dollars) (sa) 
5  Merch wholesalers:  total (mil. of chained  1996 
dollars) (sa) 
5  Index of help-wanted  advertising  in newspa- 
pers (1967 =  100; sa) 
5  Employment:  ratio; help-wanted  ads: no. 
unemployed 
Table 11  CONTINUED 
Series  Transformation 
























LHELX Has the Business Cycle Changed  and Why? * 213 
Table 11  CONTINUED 
Series  Transformation 
name  code  Description 
5  Civilian  labor force: employed,  total (thous., sa) 
5  Civilian labor force: employed,  nonagric. indus- 
tries (thous., sa) 
5  Unemploy.  by duration: persons  unempl.  5 to 
14 wks  (thous., sa) 
5  Unemploy.  by duration: persons  unempl.  15 
wk  +  (thous., sa) 
5  Unemploy.  by duration: persons  unempl.  15 to 
26 wk  (thous., sa) 
5  Unemploy.  by duration: persons  unempl.  less 
than 5 wk  (thous., sa) 
5  Unemploy.  by duration: average  duration in 
weeks  (sa) 
2  Unemployment  rate: all workers,  16 years and 
over (%, sa) 
5  Employees  on nonag  payrolls: total, private 
(thous, sa) 
5  Employees  on nonag.  payrolls: contract con- 
struction (thous., sa) 
5  Employees  on nonag.  payrolls: durable goods 
(thous., sa) 
5  Employees  on nonag.  payrolls: manufacturing 
(thous., sa) 
5  Employees  on nonag.  payrolls: nondurable 
goods  (thous., sa) 
5  Employees  on nonag.  payrolls: finance, insur. 
and real estate (thous., sa) 
5  Employees  on nonag.  payrolls: goods- 
producing  (thous., sa) 
5  Employees  on nonag.  payrolls: government 
(thous., sa) 
5  Avg.  weekly  hrs. of prod. wkrs.: manufactur- 
ing  (sa) 
5  Avg.  weekly  hrs. of prod. wkrs.: mfg., overtime 
hrs. (sa) 
5  Employees  on nonag.  payrolls: total (thous., sa) 
5  Employees  on nonag.  payrolls: services  (thous., 
sa) 
5  Employees  on nonag.  payrolls: service- 
producing  (thous., sa) 
5  Employees  on nonag.  payrolls: wholesale  and 
retail trade (thous., sa) 
NAPM  indexes 
PMCP 
PMDEL 
1  Napm  commodity  prices index  (%) 
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Table 11  CONTINUED 
Series  Transformation 










































Napm  employment  index  (%) 
Purchasing managers'  index  (sa) 
Napm  new  orders index  (%) 
Napm  inventories  index  (%) 
Napm  production  index  (%) 
2  ln(lehcc/  gdpd) 
6  Avg  hourly  earnings  of constr wkrs: construc- 
tion ($, sa) 
2  ln(lehm/gdpd) 
6  Avg  hourly  earnings of prod wkrs: manufactur- 
ing ($, sa) 
6  Gross domestic  product: implicit price deflator 
(index, 92 =  100) 
6  Implicit price deflator: personal  consumption 
expenditures 
6  Cpi-u: all items  (82-84  =  100, sa) 
6  Cpi-u: all items less food  (82-84  =  100, sa) 
6  Cpi-u: all items less shelter (82-84  =  100, sa) 
6  Cpi-u: all items less medical  care (82-84  =  100, 
sa) 
6  Producer price index: all commodities  (82 = 
100, nsa) 
6  Spot market price index: bls. & crb.: all com- 
modities  (67 =  100, nsa) 
2  ln(psccom/gdpd)  (ac) 
6  Index of sensitive  materials prices (1990 =  100) 
2  ln(psm99q/gdpd)  (ac) 
6  Cpi-u: apparel & upkeep  (82-84  =  100, sa) 
2  ln(pu83 / gdpd)  (ac) 
6  Cpi-u: transportation (82-84  =  100, sa) 
2  ln(pu84/gdpd)  (ac) 
6  Cpi-u: medical  care (82-84  =  100, sa) 
2  ln(pu85 /gdpd)  (ac) 
6  Cpi-u: commodities  (82-84  =  100, sa) 
2  ln(puc / gdpd)  (ac) 
6  Cpi-u: durables (82-84  =  100, sa) 
2  ln(pucd/gdpd)  (ac) 
6  Cpi-u: services  (82-84  =  100, sa) 
2  ln(pus / gdpd)  (ac) 
6  Producer price index: crude petroleum  (82 = 
100, nsa) 
2  ln(pw561 /gdpd)  (ac) 
6  Producer price index: finished  consumer  goods 
(82 =  100, sa) Has the Business Cycle Changed  and Why? * 215 
Table 11  CONTINUED 
Series  Transformation 
name  code  Description 
R_PWFCSA  2  ln(pwfcsa/gdpd)  (ac) 
PWFSA  6  Producer price index: finished  goods  (82 =  100, 
sa) 
R_PWFSA  2  ln(pwfsa / gdpd)  (ac) 
Industrial Production  in Other Countries 
IPCAN  5  Industrial production:  Canada (1990 =  100, sa) 
IPFR  5  Industrial production:  France (1987 =  100, sa) 
IPIT  5  Industrial production:  Italy (1987 =  100, sa) 
IPJP  5  Industrial production: Japan (1990 =  100, sa) 
IPOECD  5  Industrial production-OECD,  European coun- 
tries (1990 =  100, sa) 
IPUK  5  Industrial production: United Kingdom (1987 = 
100, sa) 
IPWG  5  Industrial production: West Germany (1990 = 
100, sa) 
Additional  Series Shown  in Figure 4 
GFIRSQ  5  Purchases of residential  structures-1  unit 
GFIRMQ  5  Purchases of residential  structures-2  or more 
units 
CONFRC  5  Construct. put in place: priv residential bldg 
(mil. 1987$, saar) 
CONCC  5  Construct. put in place: commercial bldgs  (mil. 
1987$, saar) 
CONIC  5  Construct. put in place: industrial bldg  (mil. 
1987$, saar) 
adjusted;  saar  =  seasonally  adjusted  at  an  annual  rate;  frb  =  Federal 
Reserve  Board;  ac  =  authors'  calculations. 
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1.  Introduction 
In their contribution, Stock and Watson (henceforth, SW) provide  a com- 
prehensive  statistical account of the changes  experienced  (or not) by the 
U.S. business  cycle  over  the postwar  period.  They also  conduct  several 
exercises  that aim  at understanding  what  the sources  of those  changes 
may be. I believe  their paper will be a standard reference on the changing 
business  cycle for years to come, at least until enough  new  data become 
available to force us to revisit the issue and, perhaps, reconsider some of 
the conclusions  attained here. 
My comments  below  are just some  thoughts  provoked  by SW's paper. 
They are meant to complement their analysis or to suggest possible avenues 
of research, rather than question  any of their evidence  or conclusions. 
2.  Two Decompositions  of GDP Growth 
The paper, like the literature on which  it builds,  focuses  on the volatility 
of  the  growth  rate of GDP and  other macro variables.  In that context, 
authors and readers are often tempted  to interpret any decline  in those 
volatility  measures  as good  news,  possibly  the result  of improvements 
on the policy  front. But modern  business-cycle  theory does  not suggest 
that more  GDP stability  is something  to be  desired,  always  and  every- 
where-certainly  not, at least, in economies  that experience  continuous 
shocks  to technology,  preferences,  external demand  and investment  op- 
portunities, public-good  requirements, etc. Hence, by focusing on the vol- 
atility of raw measures  of GDP one may be overstating  (a) the extent of 
the possible  benefits  from any observed  decline  in volatility,  and (b) the 
room left for further, more aggressive  stabilization  policies. 
In order to address  the previous  concern (at least in theory), one may 
specify  a decomposition  like 
Ayt  =  Ayt  +  Ayt 
where  yt denotes  (log)  output,  yt denotes  the efficient  or target level  of 
(log) output  (potential output,  for short), and y  t yt -  yt is the distance 220  GALI 
between  actual and  potential  output  (the output gap). Accordingly,  the 
standard deviation  of output  growth,  denoted  by s, is given by 
s  =  -l2  +  s2 +  2pss, 
where  s and s denote,  respectively,  the standard deviations  of yt and yt, 
and p is the correlation between  the previous  variables. Hence,  a reduc- 
tion in the volatility  of GDP growth may be due to a smaller volatility  of 
potential  output,  a decline in the volatility  of the output  gap, or a lower 
correlation between  those two variables (or a combination of any of those 
factors). 
To the extent that potential output is independent  of policy (or, at least, 
of the  sort of  stabilization  policies  we  are interested  in),  the  latter can 
influence  the volatility  of output  growth  only by inducing  changes  in s 
and/or  p. Furthermore, and given our normative interpretation of poten- 
tial output,  only  changes  in policy  that bring  about  a reduction  in the 
volatility  of the output  gap could be viewed  as a policy  improvement. 
In order to shed some light on some of the welfare and policy interpre- 
tations of the changes in the U.S. business  cycle, one would  think it might 
be useful to extend the empirical analysis of SW to each of the two compo- 
nents of GDP. That exercise faces, however,  a basic problem: neither po- 
tential  output  nor  the  output  gap  is  a theory-free  variable-certainly, 
neither is readily observable  in the absence of further assumptions. 
In order to illustrate how some of the conclusions  may depend  on one's 
view  of potential output, let me consider two alternative decompositions. 
2.1 A TRADITIONAL  DECOMPOSITION 
The first decomposition,  which  I will  refer to as traditional,  relies on the 
Congressional  Budget  Office (CBO) estimate  of potential  output,  which 
is itself based  on a smooth  estimate  of the NAIRU. The standard devia- 
tions of the quarterly time series for Ayt and Ayt constructed on the basis 
of that decomposition  are reported in the panel of Table 1 labeled CBO. 
In addition  to statistics  for the  full  sample  period  (1959:I-2001:III), the 
table also reports the corresponding  values  for two  subperiods:  59:1-83: 
IV (under the heading  "Early") and 84:I-01:III (under "Late"), as well  as 
their ratio, their absolute  difference,  and the contribution  of each to the 
observed  decline  in  the  volatility  of  output  growth  (all in  percentage 
terms). As a reference, similar statistics are reported for Ayt in the top row 
of the table. The choice of break date is motivated by some of the findings 
in SW and other related papers. 
The results of that analysis make clear that both components  of output 
growth  have  experienced  a volatility  decline  in  the  second  half  of  the Comment  *  221 
Table 1  OUTPUT  DECOMPOSITIONS  AND CHANGES  IN VOLATILITY 
Standard  deviation  (%) 
Quantity  Full  Early  Late  Ratio  Change  Contribution 
Ayt  1.22  1.48  0.72  0.49  -0.76 
CBO: 
Ayt  0.42  0.48  0.28  0.59  -0.20  22.0% 
Ayt  0.88  1.06  0.54  0.51  -0.52  65.5% 
NK: 
Ayt  1.01  1.18  0.68  0.58  -0.50  50.3% 
Agt  0.75  0.86  0.53  0.62  -0.33  23.0% 
postwar  period, with volatility  ratios of an order of magnitude  similar to 
those  found  in SW. We notice,  however,  that given  that the traditional 
decomposition  attributes,  on  average,  a  much  larger  volatility  to  the 
output-gap  component,  the contribution  of the latter to the absolute  de- 
cline in the volatility of GDP growth is almost three times that of potential 
output. 
2.2 A NEW KEYNESIAN  DECOMPOSITION 
The second  decomposition  analyzed  is one consistent  with  a simple ver- 
sion of an optimizing  new Keynesian (NK) model. Following  some recent 
work  with  coauthors  Mark Gertler and David  Lopez-Salido,1 I consider 
the measure  of aggregate  inefficiency 
gapt  =  mrst  -  mpnt 
where  mrst denotes  the (log) marginal rate of substitution,  and mpnt is 
the (log) marginal product of labor. For simplicity I assume the following 
parametrization  (consistent  with  standard  specifications  of  preferences 
and technology): 
mrst  =  oct  +  P nt, 
mpnt  =  yt  -  nt, 
where  ct denotes  (log)  consumption  and  nt (log)  hours,  while  a  and  (p 
respectively  denote the elasticities of the marginal utility of consumption 
and the marginal disutility  of labor. Next, let us define potential  output as 
1. Gali, Gertler,  and L6pez-Salido  (2001). 222  *  GALI 
the level of output that  would prevail  in equilibrium  if markups  remained 
constant  at their steady-state  levels (e.g., in the absence  of wage and price 
rigidities, and under the assumption of constant desired markups).2  In 
that context, and under a few auxiliary  assumptions,3  the following rela- 
tionship obtains (up to an additive constant): 
gapt 
aY +  ( 
Thus, it is straightforward  to use the previous relationship  to construct 
a time series for Ayt  and (as a residual) Agt,  conditional  on a calibration 
of a  and (p.  In what follows I assume a  = 1 and (p  = 5, which corresponds 
to the baseline calibration  in Gali, Gertler,  and Lopez-Salido  (2001).  The 
bottom panel (labeled  NK) in Table  1 reports  standard  deviations of each 
component  based on the decomposition  just described,  together  with sta- 
tistics summarizing  its evolution across the two periods. 
As was the case under a traditional  decomposition,  both components  of 
output growth appear  to have experienced  a substantial  volatility  decline. 
However, the relative contribution  of each component to the observed 
decline in output-growth  volatility is now significantly  different  from the 
previous case: the greater  stability of potential output now accounts for 
almost two-thirds  of that  volatility decline, the role left for the output gap 
being smaller (though far from negligible). 
The previous analysis illustrates  the extent to which the interpretation 
that we may want to give to the evidence of a decline in output volatility 
cannot be model-free. Instead, it will depend critically on one's views 
regarding  how potential  output is determined.  Thus,  by stressing  the im- 
portance  of changes  in output-gap  volatility,  the traditional  decomposition 
allows (at  least  potentially)  for a strong  role of policy as a factor  behind the 
milder  cycle.  By  way of contrast,  the evidence  based on the NK decomposi- 
tion appears  to be easier  to reconcile  with an interpretation  that stresses a 
reduction  in the size of nonpolicy  shocks  experienced  by the U.S.  economy 
(while still leaving some room for a significant  policy role). 
3.  Predictable  vs. Unpredictable  Components 
One of the most interesting  exercises in SW's paper is the analysis, in a 
multivariate  framework,  of the contribution  to the decline in GDP  volatil- 
ity of the predictable and unpredictable  components of several macro 
2. That definition  is consistent,  e.g.,  with  the framework  of Erceg, Henderson,  and Levin 
(2000), Journal  of Monetary Economics,  October, 281-313. 
3. Basically all that is needed is thatboth labor productivity and the savings ratio be exogenous. Comment  *  223 
time  series.  SW conclude  that changes  in the unpredictable  component 
(reflected  in  the  variance-covariance  matrix  E  of  reduced-form  VAR 
innovations)  seem  to have  played  a dominant  role. In a structural VAR 
framework,  however,  changes  in  E  must  be  caused  by  changes  in  the 
variance-covariance  matrix of structural shocks,  and/or  changes  in the 
matrix of contemporaneous  relationships  among  the different variables. 
That observation raises an interesting question, which is briefly addressed 
in Blanchard and Simon (2001),  but not in SW's paper: if we agree that mone- 
tary policy  affects aggregate  demand  and output  only with  a lag (an as- 
sumption  often incorporated in structural VARs), is it possible to reconcile 
the dominant role of the unpredictable component detected by SW with the 
policy-improvement  hypothesis  (e.g., a more aggressive  Taylor rule)? 
In my  opinion  that question  can only  be addressed  using  an explicit 
structural model  with  an embedded  policy  rule of the sort used  by SW 
in the last section  of their paper.  The SW model,  however,  may  not be 
suitable to address the question posed above, since it does not incorporate 
any policy  transmission  lags. Perhaps a more realistic model  incorporat- 
ing  those  lags  [like those  of Rotemberg and Woodford  (1999), or Chris- 
tiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2001)] could be used in future research to 
reexamine the role of policy, in light of SW's evidence  pointing  to a domi- 
nant role of the unpredictable  component  as an immediate  factor behind 
the changing  volatility  of U.S. GDP growth. 
4. The  Cross-Country  Dimension 
SW's paper, as well as much of the related literature, studies the phenom- 
enon of changes in the business  cycle from a time-series perspective.  But 
measures  of macroeconomic  volatility  appear to vary across countries no 
less  than  they  vary  over  time.  Can we  learn anything  from  the  cross- 
country  evidence  regarding  the  sources  of  the  observed  changes  (over 
time) in the U.S. business cycle? Here I just want to point to some evidence 
reported by Acemoglu  and Zilibotti (1997), and whose  possible  connec- 
tion with  the issue  at hand  is, to say the least, intriguing.  They provide 
rather strong evidence  of a negative relationship across countries between 
their level of development  (measured by per capita GDP) and their cycli- 
cal volatility  (measured by the standard deviation  of GDP growth).4 Fatas 
4. Acemoglu  and Zilibotti develop  a model  that explains  their evidence  as the result of the 
insufficient  diversification  of productive  activities  resulting  from project indivisibilities, 
which is only overcome  as an economy  develops  (possibly thanks to a sequence of favor- 
able shocks). Kraay and Ventura (2001) provide  an alternative explanation  based  on the 
patterns of specialization  during the process of development  of an economy.  While both 
stories may help explain the cross-sectional  evidence,  neither mechanism  seems a plausi- 
ble candidate  to explain  the taming  of the U.S. business  cycle over the postwar  period. 224  HALL 
and Mihov  (2001) show,  using  data for OECD countries and U.S. states, 
that the negative  correlation between  income levels  and output volatility 
mentioned  above  does  not go away  once they control for variables that 
are likely  to be correlated with  both (e.g., the size  of government). 
To what  extent are the two phenomena  related? The pattern of varia- 
tions  in  the  share  of  services  in  GDP, across  countries  and  over  time, 
would  have seemed  a good candidate to reconcile the two dimensions  of 
the  evidence,  but  SW provide  a simple,  unambiguous  rejection of that 
hypothesis.  Similarly, some  of the candidate  explanations  proposed  for 
the U.S. time-series evidence  (e.g., policy improvement)  do not seem par- 
ticularly plausible  explanations  of the cross-country evidence.  As macro- 
economists  we can only hope  that a successful  explanation  is found  that 
can account for both dimensions  of the phenomena. 
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Figure 1 displays the type of evidence  considered in this paper and shows 
why  the conclusion  is compelling.  The figure shows  the volatility  of real 
GDP, measured as the squared deviation of the one-year growth rate from 
its average value. Volatility by this measure ended discontinuously  in 1984, 
reappearing only in the recessions of 1990 and 2001. The econometric analy- 
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The plot shows the squared  values of the one-year  change  in log of real  GDP  less its mean, squared. 
sis in the paper supports the conclusion  of the naked eye. The paper also 
shows that the decline occurred in many measures and not just in real GDP. 
The authors stick relentlessly  to a single definition of volatility, namely 
the one  used  in Figure  1, the variance  of one-year  rates of change.  Al- 
though  it is useful  to have a standard measure to compare over time pe- 
riods  and across variables,  concentration  on one-year  changes  does  not 
tell the whole  story of volatility by any means. The persistence of random 
movements  matters. One-year changes  look the same for a series subject 
to white-noise  disturbances  around  a predictable  mean as they do for a 
series that evolves  as a random walk. But there is much more uncertainty 
in the longer  run about a random  walk.  Longer differences  are a good 
way  to get at this issue. Figure 2 shows  the volatility  of five-year rates of 
change  of real GDP. In this plot, the first half of the 1990s was  a period 
of high  volatility,  as growth  from the late 1980s was  below  par. Notice 
that recessions-a  dominant  source  of volatility  in one-year  rates-are 
not important for five-year rates. The recession years 1975, 1990, and 2001 
contribute spikes to Figure 1 but are troughs of volatility  in Figure 2. The 
evidence  for diminished  volatility  is weaker in five-year rates of change. 
In fact, a better summary would  be that the economy  is hit by episodes  of 
volatility in five-year rates-mostly  from periods of high or low growth- 
against a background  of stability. 
Figure 3 shows  that the volatility  of ten-year changes in real GDP tells 
yet  another story. There were  two  huge  spikes-high  growth  from the 
late 1950s to the late 1960s, and low  growth  from the early 1970s to the 
early 1980s. At other times, ten-year growth rates have remained at nor- 
mal levels.  In particular, ten-year growth  has been normal since 1984, so 226 * HALL 
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The plot shows the squared  values of the five-year  change  in log of real GDP  less its mean,  squared. 
the hypothesis  of a break in  1984 receives  more  support  from ten-year 
changes  than from five-year changes. 
One of the conclusions  of the paper is that changes  in persistence  pa- 
rameters have been an unimportant  source of changes  in volatility.  I be- 
lieve  that this conclusion  is special to the one-year framework. Consider 
the following  example,  stripped  to the basics of the issue. A series-say 
log real GDP-evolves  according to an AR(1) process: 
yt  =  PYt -  1  +  Et. 
Figure 3 VOLATILITY  OF REAL GDP OVER TEN-YEAR INTERVALS 
The plot shows  the squared values  of the ten-year change in log of real GDP less its mean, squared. Comment  . 227 
The variance of the kth difference  is 
V(yt  -  yt-k)  =2  l  +  + 
Notice that this confirms my earlier statement about the role of persistence 
in determining  the relation between  the length of the difference and vola- 
tility. If a series is white  noise  (p =  0 ), the variance is 2o2 for differences 
of any length.  If a series is a random walk,  (p =  1), the variance is ko2, 
rising in proportion  to the length  of the difference. 
Stock and Watson are concerned about how  changes in the persistence 
parameter-here  p-affect  volatility, measured as the variance of the dif- 
ference. Consider the derivative  of the variance with respect to p, evalu- 
ated at p =  1 (a relevant point, because  real GDP and most  other series 
are close  to random walks): 
dV _  k(k -  2)  2 
dp  2 
Figure  4 DERIVATIVE  OF VOLATILITY  WITH  RESPECT  TO THE 
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The derivative is negative for one-year differences, zero for two-year, and 
then rises to high  positive  levels  for longer  differences.  Figure 4 shows 
the relation. 
Thus the finding that changes in persistence parameters have made lit- 
tle contribution  to changing  volatility  is almost  automatic  for short dif- 
ferences.  But  the  conclusion  could  be  completely  different  for  longer 
differences.  Again,  one-year  differences  tell an incomplete  story. 
Within  the  one-year-difference  framework,  Stock  and  Watson  make 
many important contributions. In particular, they cast doubt on a number 
of popular  and plausible  explanations:  that the economy  is more stable 
because its more stable sectors are growing  faster, because modem  infor- 
mation technology  has tamed the inventory  cycle, and because  financial 
markets have  fewer  frictions. They give  moderate  support  to the view 
that monetary  policy  is less  a generator  of shocks  and  more  a tool  for 
moderating  other shocks.  But the primary conclusion  is that key macro 
variables such as real GDP are more stable because  the economy  suffers 
smaller outside  shocks now  than it did before 1984. 
Discussion 
Bob Gordon questioned  the metric of volatility  used by the authors. He 
suggested  using a gap-oriented  metric such as the 20-quarter moving  av- 
erage of the absolute value  of the GDP gap, following  Blanchard and Si- 
mon.  He noted  that using  this metric, volatility  does  not appear to be a 
step function, but looks  more like there was  a gradual decline.  He took 
issue with  what he saw as a tendency  in the paper to look at shocks one 
at a time, rather than thinking  about the interaction of many shocks. As 
an example,  he noted  that Volcker's  actions  were  a response  to the oil 
shocks of the 1970s. 
On a related point, Mark Gertler suggested  that standard linear meth- 
ods  might be biased  in favor of finding  shifts in volatility  instead  of re- 
gime  shifts. He noted  that a major difference between  the early part of 
the sample  and the later part is that there were a lot of major recessions 
in  the first half,  and  very  few  in  the  second  half.  He  pointed  out  that 
if the business  cycle is asymmetric  in that contractions are sharper than 
expansions,  this might  show  up  as a change  in volatility  rather than a 
shift in the propagation  mechanism.  As  an example,  he  suggested  that 
the recession  of 1980-1982  could  be plausibly  attributed to the Volcker 
disinflation  rather than to bad shocks. On the recession  of 1974-1975  he 
noted  that although  the consensus  view  is that it was  due  to shocks,  a 
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recent paper by Robert Barsky has argued  otherwise.  He was  interested 
to see whether  as a general  rule the big  recessions  can be explained  by 
shocks, and if so, what are the shocks. He also commented  that any expla- 
nation  of the reduction  in output  volatility  must be consistent  with  the 
reduction  in the volatility  of inflation. 
Jonathan Parker suggested  that it might be interesting to see what sur- 
vey  forecast  data have  to say  about reduced  volatility.  He pointed  out 
that if economic  forecasts lag, it might  give  a sense that the reduction in 
volatility  described  in the paper was  a surprise. In this case, it could be 
that a VAR would  do a better job of fitting the data than actual expecta- 
tions over the period  of the decline  in volatility. 
Justin Wolfers  suggested  a link between  Gali and Hall's  evidence  on 
the reduction in the volatility of potential output and the output gap, and 
the debate about the Phillips curve in the session  on Nancy  Stokey's pa- 
per. He said that in order for the Phillips  curve to describe the inflation 
path of the 1990s, it is necessary to have enormous volatility in the natural 
rate of unemployment  which cannot be squared with the observed reduc- 
tion  in volatility.  He  also  remarked  that since  the  sample  size  used  to 
generate sectoral employment  data triples over the period in question,  it 
might be safer to base decisions  on sectoral differences  on output shares 
rather than employment  shares. 
Fabrizio Perri remarked that it might be particularly useful  to look at 
international  data when  trying to attribute the reduction  in volatility  to 
changes  in shocks or policy.  He noted  that there has also been a big de- 
cline  in volatility  in Europe. On this issue,  Ken Rogoff  mentioned  that 
economists  working  at the IMF have  produced  evidence  of a decline  in 
the volatility  of output  and employment  across the OECD. However,  he 
noted  that the volatility  of stock prices has clearly not fallen. He specu- 
lated  that  this  could  imply  that  improvements  in  measurement  over 
time are driving some of the observed  reduction in volatility  of GDP and 
employment. 
Jean Boivin  remarked  that the IS curve  in the structural model  used 
to evaluate  the contribution  of policy  changes  is very reduced-form.  He 
worried  that  expectations  of  monetary  policy  are not  sufficiently  con- 
trolled for, leaving  open  the possibility  that changes  in monetary  policy 
could  contaminate  the estimates  of changes  in volatility. 
In summing  up, Mark Watson welcomed  the comments of Bob Hall and 
Bob Gordon on the question of regime break vs. slow decline in volatility. 
Ideally, he said, the authors would  have  liked to estimate  linear models 
such  as VARs, allowing  for stochastic  volatility  in the  shocks  and  also 
drift in the regression coefficients. But this is hard to do, and the regime- 
break  approach  was  chosen  for  parsimony.  He  also  welcomed  Hall's 230 *  DISCUSSION 
approach of comparing  different frequencies  of the spectrum  in his dis- 
cussion.  He remarked that Ahmed,  Levin, and Wilson  look at the spec- 
trum of GDP before and after 1984 and find that the entire spectrum shifts 
down.  He noted that this suggests  that the finding of declining  volatility 
is robust to which  frequency  of the spectrum  is looked  at. Watson  also 
welcomed  Jordi Gali's comments  on the output gap and potential output 
as fundamentally  important. 
On the  discussion  of regime  break vs.  slow  decline  in volatility,  Jim 
Stock remarked that the test for the existence  of a break also has power 
against  slowly  changing  processes,  although  the  dating  of the break is 
less robust. On Ken Rogoff's  point on stock price volatility,  he suggested 
that the most important change in measurement  in the sample  period is 
a change in accounting rules, which implies  that the measurement  issues 
are more likely  to be on the stock-price side. 